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Forest Taxation and REDD+: An Analysis of Potential Impacts in 
Cameroon, Ghana and Sierra Leone  
 
Stephen Spratt, Philip Kargbo, Emmanuel Marfo, Emmanuel Ngungoh and 
Sabaheta Ramcilovik-Suominen 
 
Summary 
 
This research explores the impacts that REDD+ could have on forest tax systems in three 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa, and considers how policy could be designed to increase the 
chances that these impacts are positive. To assess this, a methodological framework is 
identified and adapted. The framework has been used to explore how the implementation of 
a new policy regime affects the interests and thus behaviours of actors in related, existing 
regimes. The implementation of REDD+ in relation to forest tax systems seems well suited to 
such an approach. 
 
The countries concerned are Cameroon, Ghana and Sierra Leone. While they are at different 
stages of the process, a common finding is that long-term impacts will depend on the detail 
of REDD+ design and implementation, and that many of the most important decisions have 
yet to be taken. Domestically, the key outstanding questions are: the extent of stakeholder 
participation in the design and implementation of programmes; how equitably financial 
benefits are distributed; whether REDD+ coverage is restricted to forest areas that are 
already protected, or extended to areas currently used for commercial forestry; how 
monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) is implemented and whether this overlaps with 
forestry reporting practices; whether REDD+ is implemented nationally or locally; and 
whether existing or new channels are used. 
 
As well as these domestic policy choices, three international aspects of REDD+ that will have 
a strong influence on its long-term impacts have not been settled. First, there is the question 
of whether and how REDD+ finance will come with governance conditions; second, what will 
the total level of REDD+ financing ultimately be, and how will this be allocated between 
countries; and finally, a crucial factor in determining the impact on the forestry sector will be 
the value of REDD+ per unit of carbon. Depending on how these questions are answered in 
practice, a number of scenarios could develop, and this paper identifies those where the 
impact of REDD+ on forest tax objectives are most likely to be positive.  
 
We therefore have a window of opportunity. The implementation of REDD+ has the potential 
to trigger positive change with respect to forest governance and taxation, but only if it is 
designed and implemented with care. What is needed is the political will to deliver this, 
internationally and nationally, and the financial resources to back this up. 
 
Keywords: REDD+; climate change; rainforests; forest taxation; forest governance; benefit 
sharing; competing rights; logging; forest peoples.  
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Introduction  
 
A third of the Earth’s surface is covered by forests. Forests provide a huge range of benefits 
and services. As well as timber for fuel and construction, they provide for the subsistence 
needs of around 1.2 billion people, and generate up to a quarter of household income for 
families living in or near forests globally (FAO 2004; Seymour 2011). Forests also provide 
habitats for flora and fauna and a variety of timber and non-wood forest products (NWFPs) 
for consumption, medicinal use and sale.  
 
As well as providing ‘amenity services’ in terms of recreation (Gupta 2012), forests provide a 
range of ecosystem services, including watershed protection and the atmospheric regulation 
of CO₂ (De Groot, Wilson and Boumans 2002). Globally, forests hold up to 250 metric tons of 
stored carbon per hectare (Lopez and Galinato 2005), and forest clearance is a major source 
of carbon emissions, accounting for around 17 per cent of annual greenhouse gas emissions 
(GHGs) (IPCC 2007).  
 
Deforestation has reduced forest cover by 40 million hectares (ha) since 2000 (Gupta 2012). 
A combination of population growth and the need for economic development means forests 
compete for space with what are often seen as more pressing, and certainly more profitable, 
land uses (Gupta 2012; Fuller 2006).  
 
As well as being a vital global resource, forests are also a key source of local economic, 
social and environmental benefits in developing countries. For the most forested countries, 
particularly in tropical regions, forests may be the most valuable resource they own. The 
extent to which this value should be extracted, and how this value should be distributed, are 
thus crucial development questions.  
 
How forests are governed and taxed is central to these questions. Forest taxation systems 
are designed to generate public revenues but may also have other objectives such as 
ensuring forests are managed sustainably over time, or that the domestic timber industry can 
expand and create more value added. This is not just about taxation, of course. Forests are 
often seen by indigenous communities as integral to their culture and way of life, while NGOs 
may see pristine forests as priceless homes of biodiversity. Concession holders, in contrast, 
see the same land as a source of revenue.  
 
The record is not good. In most low- and middle-income countries, revenues from forest 
taxation are far lower than would be expected given rates of deforestation. At the same time, 
illegal forest activities (IFAs) are rife. Despite decades of analysis and reform, the forestry 
sector remains inextricably linked to corruption and poor governance in many countries, with 
the interests of indigenous peoples receiving little, if any, attention.  
 
The Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) process is just 
beginning to encroach into these complex systems of incentives, governance arrangements 
and power relations. As the name suggests, REDD+ (and its associated initiatives) is 
designed to reduce or prevent deforestation, safeguarding forests’ role as global carbon 
sinks. As REDD+ increases in scale and reach, its impacts on the economics and 
governance of forests will increase. This will influence the ability of different stakeholders to 
achieve their objectives, including with respect to forest taxation. 
 
The research summarised in this paper was designed to explore these potential impacts, 
with three principal aims. First, to map the channels of impact and interaction between 
REDD+ and forest tax governance systems. Second, to assess the nature and scale of 
potential impacts, and the determinants of each. And third, to identify policy options to 
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increase the likelihood that REDD+ implementation will lead to positive change in forest tax 
governance systems. 
 
The paper is organised into four sections. Parts 1 and 2 describe the research questions, 
conceptual framework and methodology. Part 3 gives some background on the case study 
countries: Cameroon, Ghana, and Sierra Leone. Part 4 applies the conceptual framework 
and presents the results of this process.   
 
 
1  Research questions and case study choice  
 
The three questions that guided the research are: 
 
(i) How will the implementation of REDD+ affect the governance of different forest tax 
systems in sub-Saharan Africa, and how can the effectiveness of these systems be 
enhanced? 
(ii) How will the implementation of REDD+ affect the economics of forest taxation in sub-
Saharan Africa, and how can tax design be improved in the light of this? 
(iii) In the context of different forest tax regimes, how should REDD+ programmes be 
designed and implemented to best achieve their goals in a complementary way? 
 
The research took place in three countries: Cameroon, Ghana and Sierra Leone. The 
countries chosen have enough in common to enable comparison: i.e. they are all in sub-
Saharan Africa’s tropical zone with natural rainforests; have experienced rapid and extensive 
deforestation (to varying degrees) and illegal forest activities; and have well developed 
systems of forest taxation in place. There are also significant differences with respect to: 
 
a. Background conditions: e.g. Sierra Leone and Ghana are Anglophone, while 
Cameroon is a Francophone country.1 Sierra Leone is a post-conflict, least developed 
country (LDC), while Cameroon and Ghana are relatively stable lower-middle-income 
countries. 
b. Approach to forest taxation: e.g. while the approach is quite centralised in all three 
countries, they also have different decentralised elements. Cameroon and Ghana use 
auctions to allocate concessions, for example, while an administrative approach is 
used in Sierra Leone. 
c. REDD+ progress: e.g. Cameroon and Ghana are both REDD+ Partner Countries, but 
Sierra Leone is a fairly recent entrant to the REDD+ system, with its national REDD+ 
‘readiness’ capacity building and pilot development programme being launched in 
2013. The process is now at its commencement stage. 
 
The application of a comparative approach is thus designed to explore the impact of these 
different elements on the research questions.  
                                                          
1  There is a large literature on the impact of colonialism on development trajectories and outcomes in Africa. In a seminal 
article in the Journal of Political Economy, for example, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) 
demonstrate different levels of financial sector development between Francophone and Anglophone countries, ascribing 
this to the impact of English Common Law versus the French Civil Code. In an American Economic Review article of 
2001, Acemoglu and Robinson examine the colonial impact on economic development more broadly, focusing on the 
role of institutions. In a study presented at the 2011 Annual Meeting of the American Political Studies Association, Lee 
and Schultz compare the impact of British and French colonial rule in different parts of the same country: Cameroon. 
Specifically on the issue of taxation, Mkandawire (2010) explores the relationship between tax effort and colonial legacy 
in Africa in an Institute for Futures Studies working paper, also published in the Journal of Development Studies. There 
are many other examples of this type of research which could be referenced, suggesting that the hypothesis that 
colonial legacies may have some impact on countries’ approach to forest taxation is worth exploring further.  
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2  Framework for analysis of interactions 
between REDD+ and forest tax systems 
 
How might the introduction of REDD+ affect outcomes in forest tax systems? This section 
describes the framework that has been used to address this question in Cameroon, Ghana 
and Sierra Leone. The framework adapts and extends that developed by Gehring and 
Oberthür (2009), which was developed to explore the ‘causal’ interactions between 
international institutions or ‘regimes’.2  
 
Three important differences should be noted. First, we are not examining the interaction 
between two international institutions (or regimes). Rather, we are exploring how the 
implementation of one such institution (REDD+) interacts with, and affects the outcomes of, 
an existing domestic institution (forest tax systems). A second difference is that these 
interactions and effects cannot be tested empirically, as they have not yet occurred, or are 
only just beginning. What we can do, however, is identify the channels through which REDD+ 
could affect outcomes in forest tax systems, and examine the factors that could influence the 
nature of these outcomes. To capture this uncertainty, we develop a number of REDD+ 
scenarios and explore how forest tax outcomes could be differentially affected under each 
scenario, highlighting those scenarios which are likely to create the most positive effects.  
 
The final difference is the policy focus. Even where REDD+ implementation is most 
advanced (of our case studies, this is Ghana), it remains largely at the capacity building or 
pilot stage. In the case of Sierra Leone, the REDD+ process is only now at its 
commencement stage. Cameroon is somewhere in the middle, though closer to Ghana than 
to Sierra Leone. As most of the key aspects of REDD+ implementation are yet to be finalised 
in all cases, and have not even been discussed in some, there is an opportunity to influence 
policy. Accordingly, the final part of this research examines how policy in each country could 
influence which REDD+ scenarios come to fruition, allowing us to identify policy options to 
increase the likelihood of positive impacts on forest tax systems in each country.  
 
2.1 Causal mechanisms for institutional interactions 
 
This research began with the hypothesis that REDD+ was likely to have significant impacts 
on forest taxation, and that these impacts could be positive or negative. To go further, we 
need to think about the precise mechanisms through which these impacts could occur, and 
link these to policy interventions that could affect them. For Gehring and Oberthür (2009: 
126), a ‘causal mechanism’: 
 
…may be conceived of as a set of statements that are logically connected and 
provide a plausible account of how a given cause creates an observed effect… In the 
absence of both firmly established theories of institutional interaction and large-N 
studies allowing for statistical analysis, causal mechanisms help distinguish between 
genuine causality and ‘spurious correlation’. They make explicit the underlying causal 
pathway. 
 
More explicitly: 
 
                                                          
2  Institutions are defined as: ‘…persistent and connected sets of rules and practices that prescribe behavioural roles, 
constrain activity, and shape expectations’ (Keohane 1989: 3, quoted in Gehring and Oberthür 2009). Other authors use 
the term ‘regime’ in similar ways, where regimes are defined as: ‘…institutions possessing norms, decision rules, and 
procedures which facilitate a convergence of expectations’ (Krasner 1983). 
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Causal mechanisms provide a micro-foundation for the analysis of institutional 
interaction and reveal how actors matter in the process… In cases of institutional 
interaction, both the independent and the dependent variables, i.e. the source 
institution and the target institution, are located at the macro level. However, an 
international institution will rarely influence another institution directly without 
intermediate adaptation of preferences or behaviour by relevant actors. Hence, a 
concept of institutional interaction requires, like any other theory in the social 
sciences, a reliable micro–macro link. (p. 127) 
 
REDD+ will not affect forest tax systems directly, but is likely to influence the behaviour of 
different actors, and it is these changes in behaviour that may cause forest tax system 
effects. Three different steps are required for any causal mechanism to function in this way 
(emphasis added): 
 
…a situational mechanism reveals how the source institution affects the 
preferences or behaviour of relevant actors within its own domain. An action-
formation mechanism elucidates how this effect leads to a change of preferences or 
of individual behaviour of actors relevant to the target institution. In this step, 
influence is transferred from the domain of the source institution to the domain of the 
target institution. Finally, a transformational mechanism explains how the 
adaptation of the individual preferences or behaviour of relevant actors leads to a 
change of the target institution. (p. 129) 
 
For this research, the ‘situational mechanism’ is how REDD+ implementation affects 
stakeholders in the forest sector. The ‘action-formation mechanism’ describes how this leads 
to behaviour change, while the ‘transformational mechanism’ describes how this creates 
changes with respect to forest tax outcomes. 
 
While any causal mechanism between two institutions can be organised into these 
categories, Gehring and Oberthür distinguish some key mechanisms, the most relevant of 
which are described below. 
 
2.1.1 Cognitive interaction as a causal mechanism 
 
This mechanism is based upon the power of ‘ideas’ and the way they are transmitted (Haas 
1992). REDD+ implementation may lead to the generation of compelling new ideas or 
concepts, which change the perspective of actors in the forest tax sector, leading to 
behaviour change. At the most general level, for example, REDD+ could increase awareness 
of the importance of environmental issues such as climate change, and the role that forests 
play in this. This could, in principle, affect the priority given to certain activities – reducing 
illegal logging, for example – that increase effectiveness, improving outcomes in this area.  
 
What is perhaps more likely is that REDD+ implementation leads to operational innovations 
that are more effective than existing practice, leading others to adopt similar practices: 
 
Institutions share a number of functional challenges such as monitoring, verification, 
enforcement and decision making as well as the development of governance 
instruments… [this] can generally be expected to strengthen the effectiveness of the 
target institution. (p. 134) 
 
The reference to monitoring, verification and enforcement is particularly relevant, as this is an 
important overlapping area of concern, where it is possible to imagine influence from 
REDD+. 
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2.1.2 Behavioural interaction as causal mechanism 
 
In this form of causal mechanism, we see the situational, action-formation mechanism, and 
transformational mechanisms most clearly. Gehring and Oberthür (2009: 141) describe the 
steps in the process as follows: 
 
First, the source institution must produce an output, for example a set of prescriptions 
or proscriptions. Second, relevant states or non-state actors have to adapt their 
behaviour in response to the output. Third, the behavioural changes triggered by the 
source institution must be relevant for the target institution. Behavioural changes may 
be relevant for both issue-areas, or they may prompt further behavioural changes 
within the domain of the target institution. Fourth, this behavioural effect has to be 
relevant for the effectiveness of the target institution.  
 
REDD+ will certainly produce ‘prescriptions and proscriptions’, potentially affecting outcomes 
in the sector. We can go further than this, however. As well as formal changes of this kind, 
REDD+ will have subtler effects. From a governance perspective, for example, REDD+ 
implementation and operation is likely to influence existing power relations, changing 
incentives and behaviour. From an economics perspective, the influx of new revenue 
streams, and the potential impact on existing revenue streams, is also likely to change 
incentives and thus behaviour.  
 
What determines whether these impacts are positive? The first, and most important, factor is 
the degree of alignment between the objectives of the two institutions. The more closely 
aligned these are, the more likely it is that impacts will be positive and vice versa. Where 
objectives are divergent, or in conflict, then the impact on the ‘target institution’ is likely to be 
negative. The strength of these negative effects will be determined by the relative power of 
actors in each institution. To put it in another way, they will depend upon the extent to which 
the incumbent institution can prevent the new institution from realising its (contradictory) 
objectives.   
 
As we shall see, the potential impact of REDD+ on forest tax systems will be strongly 
influenced by key aspects of REDD+ that remain uncertain. This is true for both the 
alignment/conflicting nature of REDD+ and tax objectives, and the relative power that 
REDD+ will have compared with incumbent institutions in our case study countries. The 
scenarios we have developed have been designed to capture these different eventualities, 
and to explore the potential behavioural implications of each.  
 
2.1.3 Impact-level interactions as causal mechanism 
 
The final forms of causal mechanism to consider are those where behaviour changes 
triggered by the new institution create direct effects on the objectives of the target institution. 
For example: 
 
Consider that protection of the stocks of cod and herring are the ultimate targets of 
two separate international institutions. As cod eats herring, successful protection of 
cod, resulting in a growing population of this species, will automatically decrease the 
population of herring. (Gehring and Oberthür 2009: 141) 
 
In this example, a new institution (cod protection) creates behaviour change amongst 
stakeholders (fishermen) such that they reduce their catches of cod. The unintended 
consequence, which nevertheless negatively affects the objectives of the incumbent 
institution (herring protection), is to reduce the quantity of herring.  
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The distinction between these types of mechanism and behavioural interactions is that they 
do not require behaviour change within the incumbent institution (i.e. forest tax), but rather 
rely on the ‘functional linkages’ between the two types of institution. For example, it is 
possible to imagine the global implementation of REDD+ impacting upon timber prices by 
changing the balance between supply and demand in different markets. This would affect 
revenues within the forest tax sector.  
 
A key determinant of the nature and strength of potential impacts is the degree of alignment 
between REDD+ and forest tax objectives, which are briefly summarised below.  
 
2.2 Objectives of forest tax systems and REDD+ 
 
There are many potential objectives of forest taxation. While we do not suggest that all 
countries actively pursue all of these goals, our analysis does seek to explore how REDD+ 
implementation could affect the achievement of objectives in the following areas: revenue 
raising potential; sustainable forest management (SFM); equitable sharing of forest taxes; 
promotion of domestic industries; support for sustainable livelihoods; and the promotion of 
good governance. 
 
The principle objectives of REDD+ are: conservation of existing forest carbon stocks; 
creation of new forest carbon stocks (reforestation/afforestation); protection of biodiversity; 
equitable sharing of benefits; and the creation of sustainable livelihoods for forest 
communities. 
 
At face value, some objectives seem well aligned. Most obviously, both forest taxation and 
REDD+ have (potential) objectives relating to the equitable sharing of forest benefits. SFM 
and conservation-related objectives are also aligned. Others are potentially compatible, such 
as the development of the domestic forestry sector, and sustainable livelihoods for forest 
communities. In other cases, there is scope for alignment, but also conflict, as with revenue 
raising and the environmental objectives of REDD+.  
 
In these more ambiguous cases, what will determine the level of alignment or conflict is how 
the objective is pursued in practice. Raising forest tax revenue can be done in many ways, 
which are more or less compatible with sustainability objectives, whether these concern the 
total quantity of forest carbon stocks, or the extent to which forest areas are supportive of 
biodiversity. Similarly, whether the objectives of developing the domestic forestry sector and 
creating sustainable livelihoods for forest communities are compatible depends upon what 
these things mean in practice.  
 
Before applying the conceptual framework, the next section gives some background 
information on the case study countries, focusing on the forestry sector in general, and forest 
taxation in particular.  
 
 
3  Case study country backgrounds  
 
3.1 Cameroon 
 
Forty-one per cent of Cameroon’s territory is covered with forests, which stock at least 5 Gt 
of carbon (REDD+ Technical Secretariat, Cameroon undated). Between 1990 and 2010, 
Cameroon lost 18.1 per cent of its forest cover, or around 4,400,000 ha (FAO 2011). The 
main driver has been conversion for agriculture (80 per cent of forest loss) followed by 
logging and fuel harvesting (MINFOF 2015). Less than 20 per cent of the forest outside 
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protected areas remains free from past or planned logging activity (Interview with Center for 
International Forestry Research (CIFOR), 28 June 2015 in Yaoundé). Illegal logging is 
estimated to account for half of Cameroon’s entire timber harvest (pers. comm. MINEPDED 
official 2015). 
 
The forest sector is central to Cameroon’s economy, accounting for 2.7 per cent of GDP and 
49 per cent of taxes, and creating nearly 200,000 formal and informal jobs (pers. comm. 
MINEPDED official 2015). Forestry has always been important politically, with its resources 
used to reward political supporters and mobilise support from rural communities for political 
appointments (Vincent, Gibson, and Boscolo 2005)  
 
The forestry industry is very influential, having long-standing connections with local 
government and traditional authorities. In remote areas, large foreign companies have even 
provided services and infrastructure. Historically, French and Italian companies have 
dominated the sector, but from the 1980s, Greek, Lebanese, and domestic companies have 
also entered the market. More recently, Asian companies have become increasingly 
important. 
 
The forestry sector in Cameroon has been undergoing reforms since the mid-1990s. The 
main changes have been: i) the public auction system for logging concessions and sales of 
standing volumes introduced by the 1994 law; ii) the (partial) log export ban in 1999;3 and iii) 
industrialisation induced by the log export ban. Until 1994/1995, the forestry sector was 
subject to relatively low taxation. The introduction of the Annual Forestry Fee (Redevance 
Forestière Annuelle – RFA) began to change this, particularly as it has been increased on a 
number of occasions. The original split for the proceeds of the RFA was 50/40/10 for central 
government, local government and forest communities respectively.  
 
The main source of forest tax revenue before 1998/1999 was the export tax. Subsequently, 
the RFA became the main revenue source when the export ban was introduced. Following 
the global economic crises of 2008, the export tax was reinstated while the RFA was reduced 
by half. In 2010, a total of US$32.2 million was raised through forest taxation. 
 
Forest tax governance in Cameroon is split across various ministries, with the most important 
being the Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife (MINFOF), the Ministry of Environment, Nature 
Protection and Sustainable Development (MINEPDED), and the Ministry of Finance. 
International actors play a very important role in the forestry sector, forming a ‘Consultation 
Circle of Partners’ (CCPM) for MINFOF and MINEPDED. The President remains the most 
important political actor in Cameroon.  
 
International support for Cameroon’s 1994 forestry reforms was partly due to their early 
adoption of decentralisation. This resulted in four institutional mechanisms: (i) council forests; 
(ii) community forests; (iii) annual forestry fees; and (iv) community-managed hunting zones. 
Despite these reforms, forestry taxation remains fairly centralised, with collection and use 
controlled by central government.  
 
Prior to 1994, forestry revenue did not really benefit local communities. The RFA was partly 
designed to correct this, stipulating a share to be redistributed to decentralised 
administrations and rural villages. Amounts received have been variable, with some 
requirements for channelled funds to be used for health and education spending. In parts of 
the country that do not receive forest revenues, these costs are covered by central 
government, causing complaints from forest communities that they are not benefiting from 
the exploitation of resources in their areas. Municipalities that do not border logging titles are 
                                                          
3  To enhance sustainability, export of traditional species, such as sapelli, sipo, and iroko, was prohibited, while the export 
of species to be promoted and other lower value species, such as ayous and azob, was allowed. 
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not entitled to the RFA. These excluded municipalities are also the constituencies of some of 
the most powerful politicians in the country, who are likely to use their influential positions in 
public life to lobby for their municipalities to benefit from the RFA in the pending forest law 
(see below). 
 
A ‘fiscal recentralisation’ law was passed in 2009 in an attempt to address this. The law 
stipulates that half of the 40 per cent of the RFA received by each municipality must be 
recentralised for redistribution to all municipalities in the country. To date, however, the 
mechanism has achieved reversal of previous fiscal decentralisation, rather than 
redistribution to enhance social equity.  
 
This generates ethnic tensions and also results in IFAs among some local communities in 
forested council areas who feel they are being treated inequitably, as well as a degree of loss 
of power by traditional rulers, as community members look increasingly to state authorities 
for leadership and far less to traditional rulers (community leader in Mbalmayo, 2015). 
 
While Cameroon’s 1994 forestry reforms were considered relatively progressive, severe 
governance problems persist. Partly in response, a draft forestry law is currently pending 
ratification by parliament. It is reported that the law will have the following objectives: to 
address the observed flaws in the practice of the law; integrate a regional dimension in the 
management of forest resources; integrate the commitments entered into by the country at 
the national level and under regional and international agreements; address the concerns of 
climate change; take more account of the real capacities of forests in development; improve 
transparency and governance in the sector; encourage a timber-processing industry that 
assists the country to develop sustainably; and encourage the full adherence of forest users 
to the sustainable management of the resource. 
 
3.2 Ghana 
 
A quarter of Ghana was originally covered with tropical forest. Ghana has lost a third of its 
forest cover with the annual deforestation rate estimated at 2 per cent (FAO 2010a), and only 
16 per cent of reserves classified as being in very good condition (Hawthorne and Abu-Juam 
1995). Forest resources are found in two main zones: high forest and savannah. There are 
266 forest reserves in Ghana, which focus on production, protection, conversion and 
research.  
 
Timber production occurs in almost half of the total area within the forest reserves, with a 
total annual allowable harvest of 500,000m3. Timber is also sourced from areas outside 
forest reserves (off-reserve areas) which are mainly agricultural forest mosaic landscapes 
with a total annual allowable harvest of 1.5 million m3. Forestry thus plays an important role 
in national life, earning the country about €138 million from timber exports in 2014 (TIDD 
2014). Its contribution to GDP, however, declined from 3.7 per cent to 2.2 per cent from 2009 
to 2013, mainly due to a reduction in timber exports (TIDD 2014). 
 
According to the REDD+ Readiness Proposal for Ghana (GFC 2010), the principal drivers of 
deforestation and degradation in Ghana broadly are: (i) agricultural expansion (50 per cent); 
(ii) wood harvesting (35 per cent); (iii) urban expansion and infrastructure (10 per cent); and 
(iv) mining (5 per cent). 
 
Formally, the ownership of forests is held by stools4 in trust for the communities, but all rights 
over timber are vested in the state. The ownership of land, even if managed as a forest 
reserve, is not altered. Forest reserves under state management are thus largely still 
classified as stool lands.  
                                                          
4  Stool lands are customary units of land usually held in trust for the people by traditional leaders. 
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The formal objective of the forest tax system in Ghana is to optimise revenue from the use of 
forest resources to cover the cost of managing and developing forest resources for the 
benefit of present and future generations, and to share the benefits equitably. There are on-
going discussions about reviewing the forest tax and revenue system, and paramount 
amongst these is the constitutional review process.5  
 
The forestry sector in Ghana is comprised of several actors with diverse interests.6 Powerful 
interests in the timber industry largely determine the regulation of the sector. The timber 
industry, for example, has been cited as a powerful actor with significant lobbying power 
(Kotey, Francois, Owusu, Yeboah, Amanor and Antwi 1998: 79).  
 
Chiefs and traditional authorities were responsible for revenue collection (Kotey et al. 1998) 
until 1962 when the state took over this role. Today, the place of stools and traditional 
authorities in the distribution of forest revenue is established in the Constitution. District 
assemblies (DAs) have also been involved in forestry since 1998, acting as a local 
implementing agency of central government (Kotey et al. 1998). The performance of the DAs 
has been weak with respect to environmental management, largely due to resource scarcity 
and low capacity (Amanor and Brown 2003: 2). 
 
As in other countries, decentralisation in forest management has been taking place, but 
decision making remains largely centralised. While decentralised units have been created at 
the regional, district and local levels, critical resources are mainly held and key decisions 
made nationally, undermining the efficiency and effectiveness of sub-national units and 
personnel (Hansen and Lund 2011). More than half of forest taxes are held centrally by the 
Forestry Commission (FC), for example. The central government has also been reluctant to 
decentralise sectors where revenue generation is high (Amanor and Brown 2003).  
 
In addition to corporation tax, the existing instruments designed for the forest sector/timber 
industry in Ghana are: concession rent, stumpage fee, timber rights fees, export levy and air-
dried lumber levy. The most important instrument (revenue wise) is the stumpage fee. It is a 
volume-based fee charged on harvested timber, which is used to finance the Forestry 
Commission’s regulatory activities and to pay land-owning communities their share of 
revenue. The Timber Rights Fee (TRF) is an annual lump sum payment for the concession, 
where rights are awarded to the bidder who offers the highest annual fee. The Forestry 
Commission collects all timber rights fees. The country’s constitution prescribes however that 
all rents, royalties and revenues from stool lands have to be collected by the Office of 
Administration of Stool Lands (OASL). So even if the FC in practice collects the fees, the 
OASL remains the institution responsible for this collection. The Timber Industry 
Development Division (TIDD) export levies were introduced in 1985 to pay for industry and 
trade services, and remain an important source of financing for the Forestry Commission.  
 
Contractors bidding to obtain a timber right must include a proposed Social Responsibility 
Agreement (SRA) in their application. The SRA obliges them to provide benefits to local 
communities at a cost of no less than 5 per cent of the value of the stumpage fee of timber 
harvested. 
 
                                                          
5  In January 2010 the Constitution Review Commission (CRC) was set up to consult with the people of Ghana on the 
operation of the 1992 Constitution and any changes that may need to be made to it. This resulted in the publication of a 
comprehensive (960 pages) report titled ‘From a Political to a Developmental Constitution’. 
6  Actors with respect to timber resources include the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MOFEP), the Forestry 
Commission through the Timber Industry Development Division (TIDD), the Office of the Administration of Stool Lands 
(OASL), traditional councils, stools, district assemblies, forest communities, and Ghana Timber Millers’ Organization 
(GTMO), Chainsaw Lumbers, Wood Workers Association, Ghana Timber Association, Chartered Institute of Builders, 
Domestic Lumber Trade Association of Ghana (DOLTA) and the timber firms. 
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While no systematic analysis of the contribution of different tax instruments has been done, a 
few studies have looked at particular fiscal years (e.g. Hansen and Lund 2011; Birikorang, 
Okai, Asenso-Okyere, Afrane and Robinson 2001; FC 2008). Hansen and Lund (2011) 
provide the most detailed analysis, using 2005 revenue, as shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Ghana’s forest tax revenues, 2005 
Fee/tax Total revenue Percentage of total timber tax 
revenue 
Billion Ghana 
Cedi (GHC) 
Million US$ Per cent 
Stumpage fee and concession rent 80.4 8.9 45 
1 per cent and 2 per cent export levies 50.2 5.5 28 
Air-dried export lumber levy 2.8 0.3 1 
Corporation tax 47.6 5.2 26 
Total 181.0 19.9 100 
 
By far the largest source of revenue is the stumpage fee and export levies even though 
Government of Ghana subvention forms the highest, which mainly covers salaries of FC staff 
(see Table 1).   
 
The constitution stipulates how forest benefits should be allocated among stakeholders: 25 
per cent for the stool; 20 per cent to the traditional authority; and 55 per cent to the district 
assembly. The translation of these provisions in practice has been a source of conflict, 
however (Marfo 2006). In 2005, for example, while a third each went to government and the 
FC, only 13 per cent was shared among stool administrators, traditional authorities (chiefs 
and traditional councils) and the district assemblies (Hansen et al. 2011). It has also been 
reported that some funds earmarked for forest communities do not reach them, and, where 
they do, they are taken by traditional authorities (Hansen and Lund 2011).7 
 
3.3 Sierra Leone  
 
Forest resources in Sierra Leone consist of protected areas and off-reserve forest areas. The 
protected areas, covering approximately 4 per cent of the country, include 36 forest reserves, 
five game reserves, two game sanctuaries, seven national parks, four non-hunting reserves, 
and nine nature reserves (UNEP WCM 2007). Sierra Leone’s rainforests, mangroves and 
savannah forests host a high level of endemic and globally rare and threatened species. The 
Upper Guinean Forest ecosystem, which hosts the Gola Forests in the east of the country, is 
listed on the World Wildlife Fund’s (WWF) ‘Global 200’ list of critical regions for conservation 
and is included as one of Conservation International’s 34 global biodiversity hotspots (Brown 
and Crawford 2012).  
 
Between 1990 and 2010, deforestation rates averaged 20,000 ha per year. In 2010, this 
equated to 0.7 per cent of the total forest cover (FAO 2010b). Deforestation in the western 
area has been particularly rapid since the civil war of 1991-2002, which created an inflow of 
refugees to the capital, putting pressure on adjacent forested areas. Perhaps the most 
alarming effects of increasing deforestation have been changes to the water catchment area. 
As the water catchment forest has shrunk, the relationship between surface runoff, 
groundwater recharge and dry season water supplies has changed. An earlier study of the 
Bambara stream found that its water level had declined by one third during the 1990s (USDA 
Forest Service 2000). Similarly, the Kongo Dam, which together with the Guma Dam 
supplies water to Freetown and other communities around the Peninsula area, was reported 
to have dried up almost completely towards the end of the rainy season in 2004 (USDA 
Forest Service 2000). As recently as August 2017, the forested area of Mount Sugar Loaf, 
which forms part of the Western Area National Park, experienced a landslide that killed 
                                                          
7  For example, Marfo, Acheampong and Opuni-Frimpong (2012) estimate that 45 per cent of forest revenues that go to 
these stakeholders end up with traditional leaders without any mechanism to ensure equity and accountability. 
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hundreds of inhabitants. This disaster has been widely associated with deforestation along 
the foot of the mountain, where residents had built houses beyond the demarcated forest 
belt. 
 
The drivers of deforestation include shifting cultivation, wild fires, mining of minerals, stone 
and sand (largely induced by population pressures in the coastal areas of Freetown due to 
the civil war), logging for timber, firewood harvesting for sustenance and charcoal. One major 
by-product of the war-induced poverty in the country is the introduction of individually 
operated power saws as a source of livelihood; these are often used in remote areas where 
they are difficult to police due to their mobile nature (MAFFS 2014). 
 
The forestry sector employs 11.5 per cent of the country's labour force. The sector’s share of 
GDP stands at 14.8 per cent, much higher than the average for West Africa (3.7 per cent) 
and Africa (2 per cent). Timber and non-timber forest products provide employment as well 
as contributing to livelihoods in other ways. Forests provide a range of non-timber products 
and services including fruit, nuts, oils, medicinal plants, bushmeat, honey and wax, rubber, 
fuel wood, wildlife conservation, watershed management, agro-forestry, and carbon credits. 
Communities in the Peninsula Mountain forests use forests for charcoal burning, sand 
mining, and stone mining, and use wood fuel for fish processing and household cooking 
energy. Over 80 per cent of Sierra Leoneans rely on fuel wood as their primary source for 
household energy (USDA Forest Service 2000). Ninety-two and a half per cent of Sierra 
Leoneans use wood fuel for cooking, a proportion much higher than for West Africa and 
Africa respectively. Demand is expected to increase as the population rises. 
 
In Sierra Leone, forests are largely privately owned, with government owning 14 per cent. As 
of 2005, all private forests are formally owned by local, indigenous and tribal communities 
(FAO/UNDP 2011). Despite low formal ownership, the government has regulatory power 
over the use of all forests. 
 
Key stakeholders involved in the sector are the Forestry Division (FD) of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Food Security (MAFFS), the National Protected Area Authority 
(NPAA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the European Union (EU), local 
government, and forest communities. The FD sits within MAFFS and is the main institution 
responsible for the management of forestry and wildlife in Sierra Leone. Previously, the FD 
had three functional units: commercial, community, and conservation. However, the last of 
these was reformed and changed in 2012 to the new, semi-autonomous NPAA.  
 
Though not as important as central government, municipal authorities and local councils are 
involved in the collection of forest revenues, particularly transport permits for taking forestry 
products to urban areas. As elsewhere, decentralisation has not been without problems, with 
unclear definition of roles, and poor coordination between the local councils and the MAFFS. 
This has resulted in overlapping of functions, as well as some misunderstanding (particularly 
in revenue generation) (MAFFS 2014). Other important stakeholders are the donor 
community, international and domestic NGOs, private firms (including chainsaw operators), 
and local communities, particularly traditional rulers. 
 
Major forest tax reviews were held in 1989, 1999, 2004, 2008 and 2014, entailing the 
creation of new taxes and revisions to tax rates. A key factor that has influenced the changes 
in tax instruments over time is the civil war, and the resultant breakdown in law and order. A 
second issue is the very low fees and royalty rates, which have boosted demand for forest 
exploitation.8 On average, forestry tax rates from 1989 to 1999 more than trebled. From 1999 
to 2004, rates increased by 352 per cent. From 2004 to 2008, the increase was 1,215 per 
                                                          
8  A comparative survey with neighbouring countries done by the FD found that Sierra Leone's export fee for timber 
products is comparatively lower than these other countries, and suggested that this was causing higher demand for 
logging in Sierra Leone. 
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cent. From 2008 to 2014, both tax and royalty rates increased by an average of 110 per cent. 
The changes in rates over the years have been considerably higher than the changes in 
revenues mobilised. For example, revenues from the export of forestry products grew by 33 
per cent from 2008 to 2013.  
 
The primary forest taxes and related instruments used in Sierra Leone are: export taxes, 
concession licence fees, land leases (i.e. concession rent), registration fees (for power 
saws), transport permits, stumpage fees, royalties, reforestation fees, training fees, and 
revenues from fines. Despite the plethora of instruments, most revenues come from 
concession licences, timber export fees and forest products transportation permits. Of these, 
timber export fees have contributed by far the largest amount, peaking at US$865,000 in 
2011. A ban on logging implemented in 2014 led – unsurprisingly – to a sharp fall in 
revenues. The official rationale was to control illegal logging, and put systems in place to 
regulate the timber industry. The revenue effect of this ban on timber logging is reflected in 
the revenue collection data over the past years. There were no revenues from timber export 
since early 2014 when the ban was renewed and the Chief Timber Operator arrested 
alongside the government's Chief of Staff because of their alleged operations in the midst of 
the ban. This led to the dismissal of the Chief of Staff, who was eventually freed and the 
matter dismissed from court.  
 
Even before the ban was imposed, revenues were very low. In 2005, for example, the 
FAO/UNDP (2011) estimated total forest revenues at just US$648,000, compared with 
US$1.09 million in public sector costs relating to the forestry sector. Forest tax revenues in 
Sierra Leone are low compared to other sectors of the economy and compared to other key 
forestry countries in Africa. Even in the Eastern District of Kenema where the country's 
largest stock of forest cover is located, revenues are minimal. Average monthly revenue from 
forestry activities, according to the District Forestry Officer in charge, is estimated to be 
around 10-12 million Sierra Leonean Leones (US$2,000-US$2,400). 
 
However, between 2014 and September 2017, the government twice lifted the ban on timber 
exports and on both occasions the National Revenue Authority (NRA) reported much higher 
collection from accumulated stock of timber exports. In a single month in 2017 (August), 
collection from timber export fees as reported in the revenue records of the NRA of Sierra 
Leone totalled US$1.6 million. Whilst this amount seems high, it should be noted that it is 
largely the result of the accumulation of stock of timber during the periods of enforcement of 
the export ban. 
 
The distribution of financial benefits from forest exploitation according to the Forestry Division 
is as follows: paramount chief 10 per cent; chiefdom administration 30 per cent (for chiefdom 
development purposes); local council 20 per cent (for council development purposes); land 
owners 40 per cent. These allocations are applied to community concessions only. The 
government takes all revenues from state-owned forests.  
 
Location is key in determining the beneficiaries of forests. In the western area the main 
beneficiary is the government through revenues from concessions. In rural areas where 
community ownership of land is common, the communities are the beneficiaries of forest 
resources, including tax revenues.  
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4  Analysis of regime interaction and policy 
options in case study countries  
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. First, the different REDD+ scenarios that 
could emerge are outlined, and the principal governance and economic effects that these 
could have in each country are assessed. As we have seen, most REDD+ impacts will be 
mediated through the behaviour of stakeholders rather than felt directly. To capture this, key 
stakeholders in the forestry sector in each country were mapped, and an assessment made 
of how their interests could be affected by the ‘consequences’ of REDD+ implementation 
under different scenarios. These micro level behaviours were then linked to macro level 
impacts with respect to the forest tax objectives listed above. Subsequently, direct causal 
mechanisms from REDD+ to forest tax outcomes were also assessed. The final part of the 
paper returns to the REDD+ scenarios in the light of these analyses, identifies ‘preferred 
scenarios’, and explores how policy in each country could affect these.   
 
4.1 REDD+ scenarios  
 
A number of important aspects of REDD+, which will strongly influence the impacts that it 
has, remain to be determined. Some of these are located at the global level, while most are 
domestic. By ‘global’ or ‘domestic’, we mean whether or not these issues will be settled 
globally or nationally.  
 
Table 2 gives the main scenarios considered. Although there are 12 listed here, the actual 
number of scenarios is more than double this, as each example here contains at least two 
separate scenarios. ‘High vs. low’ participation is two scenarios, one ‘high participation’ and 
one ‘low participation.’  
 
Table 2 REDD+ implementation scenarios 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1.1 REDD+ scenarios and global factors 
 
The first global factor that is relevant from a scenario perspective is whether, and to what 
extent, REDD+ financing will come with conditionality from a governance perspective, and 
how strictly this would be enforced. Conditionality that leads to improved governance in the 
forestry sector is also likely to have positive impacts on the governance of forest tax systems. 
Global factors 
1 Governance conditionality vs. non-conditionality 
2 High vs. low REDD+ finance (national) 
3 High vs. low REDD+ finance (per carbon unit) 
4 High vs. low timber export prices (and agricultural commodities) 
Domestic factors 
5 High vs. low domestic timber prices (and agricultural commodities) 
6 Extensive vs. limited coverage 
7 Effective vs. ineffective monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) 
8 High vs. low participation 
9 Equitable vs. inequitable benefit sharing 
10 National, district or project level implementation 
11 Sector vs. non-sector implementation 
12 Existing vs. new channels of disbursal 
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The actual level of REDD+ financing that will be available each year is unclear. The Paris 
COP (the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference) saw developed countries 
recommit to raise US$100bn per year by 2020. Whether this commitment will be met in full, 
and what sort of finance this involves, remains uncertain. Beyond this, it is unclear what 
proportion of total finance will be allocated to REDD+ and, which may be of more practical 
importance for countries that are potential recipients of finance, how this will be allocated 
between countries. As well as donor financing, it is unclear whether carbon markets will play 
any important role in future climate finance and, if so, what role REDD+ could play in this. 
While there is no shortage of estimates of what finance is needed to support REDD+ 
activities, there is fundamental uncertainty over what the total supply of finance will be, how it 
will be allocated between countries, and what global mechanisms (e.g. market vs. non-
market based) will be used.  
 
When we consider the potential impacts of REDD+ on governance systems, as well as 
economic effects on the forestry sector, this is obviously key. In one scenario REDD+ is well 
funded at the global level, and participating countries receive large annual financing. At the 
other extreme, global REDD+ finance could be far less than hoped, with the result that 
recipient countries receive relatively limited annual financing. The governance impacts – for 
example on the relative power of different institutions and actors – will be far stronger in the 
first scenario than the second. Similarly, the impact that REDD+ could have on the 
economics of forestry – through changing relative prices for example – will be more 
pronounced in situations where the level of finance is higher. 
 
This takes us to the third factor in Table 2 (high vs. low REDD+ finance per carbon unit). 
While the total quantity of REDD+ finance at the country level sets the boundaries of its 
impact, and will have a strong influence on relative power and prestige, economic impacts 
may be more influenced by what we might call the ‘price’ of REDD+ finance. By this we mean 
the amount of finance that is available per unit of carbon. It is this ‘price’ that will determine 
the extent to which REDD+ will influence relative prices in the forestry sector.  
 
Forestry competes with many other potential land uses, particularly agriculture. Generally, 
forestry has been the lowest yielding land use, creating incentives for conversion. In this 
regard, a number of important price thresholds exist with respect to REDD+. First, if the 
annual value of finance per unit of carbon exceeds that available for a tree from commercial 
felling, an incentive is created to leave the tree standing. If this is extended across a large 
enough area, an economic incentive is created for forestry concessions to become ‘REDD+ 
concessions’, as the commercial return would be greater. While this would prevent 
deforestation from commercial forestry, other price thresholds would have to be reached to 
do the same with other forms of land use.  
 
Of course, we are interested in relative rather than absolute pricing levels. What matters is 
how REDD+ returns per hectare compare with those available from forestry and other 
potential land uses. For the export sector, this will be determined by the global prices of 
relevant commodities: timber, hardwood or agricultural products. When these prices are high, 
the value of REDD+ finance would also have to be high, suggesting that to retain its ability to 
influence deforestation pressures via economic incentives, the value of REDD+ finance 
would need to be linked to the global prices of relevant forestry and agricultural commodities.  
 
It is important to recognise that this ‘opportunity cost’ approach is only appropriate under 
certain conditions: when countries have forest areas where commercial forestry is permitted. 
In these circumstances, the opportunity of different land use is a good approximation of the 
value REDD+ finance would need to reach to affect economic incentives. As detailed in 
Gregerson, El Lakany, Karsenty, and White (2010), however, this does not apply in a number 
of cases. First, where commercial forestry is already prohibited as an area is under some 
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form of environmental protection. Although illegal activity may be taking place, the authors 
argue that it is not appropriate to take this revenue as an opportunity cost that REDD+ must 
match. Rather, the relevant cost is what would be needed to enforce the prohibition.  
 
The point is that although the total benefits of preventing illegal forest activities may be large, 
this is not necessarily true for all stakeholders. Where those stakeholders have an influence 
over policy, it is not difficult to see how implementing effective policy can be very difficult. In 
principle, it could be possible to calculate the opportunity cost of effective enforcement (i.e. 
what would be lost in illegal payments) and design incentives to address this. This is a much 
wider issue of governance, which may be particularly pronounced in the forestry sector, but 
is not unique to it.  
 
A second case where using opportunity costs may be inappropriate is where there is 
uncertainty or there are disputes over land rights, particularly where the traditional rights of 
indigenous peoples and forest communities conflict with the ownership rights of the state, or 
the commercial rights of private companies. In most cases, these local communities do not 
operate within a market economy context, or do so only at the margin. While considerable 
progress has been made in clarifying and legitimising traditional rights in the Brazilian 
Amazon, this is not the case in many other countries. Indeed, the risk is that the advent of 
REDD+ creates the opposite effects:  
 
These people at present are for the most part merely tolerated by governments 
because there is no other economically pressing demand on the land and moving 
them off the land would create pressing social and security problems and could 
involve major costs. With the incoming REDD+ funds, governments now could see 
some economic value in instituting coercive measures to have these groups stop any 
deforestation they are causing. Governments might establish preserves and not 
compensate adequately (the opportunity costs of) the groups that were using the land 
beforehand, thus creating a serious socioeconomic problem and a likely problem in 
terms of halting illegal use of the new preserves. (Gregerson et al. 2010: 11) 
 
If this risk could be avoided, which would seem an essential precondition to the fair and 
effective implementation of REDD+, calculating appropriate compensatory payments would 
be far from straightforward. The crucial point is that implementing REDD+ effectively will 
require long-standing and difficult issues such as land rights and tenure to be resolved, at 
least to some extent. More broadly, if the goal is to provide alternative ‘ways of life’ for some 
forest communities, this becomes a much more ambitious task, the costs of which are likely 
to far exceed current REDD+ estimates. 
 
While the value of REDD+ payments may be largely determined on a global basis, estimating 
these in practice is impossible without full account being taken of local conditions. Global and 
domestic factors in terms of REDD+ implementation will therefore be inextricably intertwined.  
 
4.1.2 REDD+ scenarios and domestic factors 
 
As well as questions that are outside the influence of national governments, a number of key 
elements of REDD+ will be determined by decisions taken domestically. The first listed in 
Table 2, which follows on from the previous discussion, is whether domestic timber prices 
(and those of other agricultural commodities) are high or low. While there is a relationship 
between the global and local prices of these goods, the transmission is far from 100 per cent. 
In many cases, the dynamics of the domestic market are very different from that operating 
globally, particularly in the forestry sector. In Ghana, for example, most of the permissible 
annual cut (i.e. the quantity of trees that can be legally harvested) goes to the export sector. 
The domestic sector, therefore, is largely served by timber from illegal logging, not least as 
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there are fewer controls over its sale domestically. Unsurprisingly, therefore, domestic prices 
are quite disconnected from those which pertain globally. When considering how economic 
incentives could affect behaviour via REDD+ finance, we also need to compare these with 
what is available in the domestic market.  
 
The relationship between the formal and informal sectors is very important here. If REDD+ 
finance can only be made available to those operating legally in the forestry sector, but much 
illegal logging is carried out by informal ‘chainsaw operators’ who cannot receive these 
benefits, then REDD+ cannot affect the incentives of these actors, regardless of its overall 
national level and carbon value. 
 
The second factor is whether the domestic areas affected by REDD+ are extensive or 
limited. By the latter, we mean that REDD+ is largely or entirely implemented in areas that 
are already protected from an environmental perspective. By ‘extensive’ coverage, we mean 
that REDD+ is implemented in areas that are currently used for forestry, or other commercial 
land uses. If coverage is limited, then the economic effects discussed above would be less 
relevant. If attempts are made to extend REDD+ programmes into areas where they would 
need to compete with alternative land uses, then these potential effects become highly 
relevant, and the value of REDD+ finance per unit of carbon a crucial driver. As well as these 
economic effects, which would alter the economic incentives of important forestry sector 
stakeholders, governance impacts – in terms of the relative power and influence of different 
actors – would be expected.  
 
A third important factor that will largely be determined domestically is whether monitoring, 
reporting and verification (MRV) is effective or not. This will be crucial in determining whether 
REDD+ succeeds regardless of whether its coverage is limited or extensive. In the former 
case, currently protected forest areas may not have commercial logging, but they do suffer 
from illegal logging of all forms. The extent to which REDD+ is able to reduce this will be 
largely determined by how effective domestic MRV procedures are. If REDD+ coverage is 
extended into areas that are not currently protected, then MRV procedures will need to be 
stronger still, as the commercial pressures driving deforestation will be significantly higher.  
 
The next two factors are closely related. The first contrasts scenarios where a wide range of 
stakeholders have been involved in the design and implementation of REDD+ programmes 
(‘high participation’) with those where these have been centrally imposed (‘low participation’). 
The second issue is whether REDD+ financing (and related benefits) are distributed 
equitably or inequitably amongst different stakeholders. While there will be disagreement 
over what qualifies as ‘equitable’ in this regard, it seems likely that the more equitable (and 
meaningful) the participation in REDD+ programme design and implementation, the more 
likely it is that the benefits of these programmes will also be distributed equitably. Questions 
of benefit sharing are inextricably linked to ownership rights, where conflicts between the 
‘traditional rights’ of forest communities, the commercial rights of private operators, and the 
ownership rights of government are central. How these questions are answered will have a 
strong influence on the interests and incentives of different groups, and will therefore be a 
significant input into the ‘behavioural causal mechanism’ described above. 
 
The final three factors as listed in Table 2 all consider how REDD+ is implemented in 
practice, particularly the level and institutions through which finance is channelled. The first 
question is whether this occurs at the national level (i.e. where REDD+ finance goes to 
central government and is then distributed), or the local/district level (i.e. where some or all 
finance goes to local government), or the project level (i.e. where finance goes directly to 
REDD+ projects without being intermediated by state agencies).  
 
Assuming that the state retains a significant role, the second question is whether REDD+ is 
implemented through forestry institutions or other agencies. The third question is whether 
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existing channels for the disbursal of forest-related funds are used, or whether new 
institutions are created to do this. As has been described above, for example, traditional 
rulers and their administrations play an important role in distributing current forest tax 
revenues in all of our case study countries. Would they have a similar function within REDD+ 
programmes? This final set of domestic factors will have a strong influence over whether 
REDD+ entrenches existing problems (of nepotism for example), builds upon existing 
successes where they exist, or starts afresh with the potential for greater change.  
 
4.2 Forms of REDD+ consequences in three countries  
 
In this section we describe some of the changes that may result from REDD+ implementation 
in two areas: governance and economics. For governance, this refers to new institutions that 
will be established, and existing institutions that will be reformed, or significantly affected. 
Similarly, from an economic perspective, this refers to new revenue streams that will be 
created, and existing revenue streams that will be affected.  
 
Table 3 summarises the impacts of REDD+ implementation that we currently know about in 
our case study countries. As we can see, each country has seen a number of new 
institutions established as a result of REDD+. In Cameroon, the REDD+ Steering Committee 
is comprised of eight government ministries and agencies, civil society groups, indigenous 
peoples, the private sector and local elected officials. The most powerful ministry on the 
committee, and with respect to REDD+ implementation, is the Ministry of the Environment, 
Nature Protection and Sustainable Development (MINEPDED). A Technical Secretariat (TS) 
has also been established under MINEPDED to establish criteria for REDD+ pilot projects. 
The TS will also work with the National Observatory on Climate Change (ONACC) to 
establish carbon stocks and monitor the social and environmental impact of REDD+ projects. 
The TS and ONACC will oversee Cameroon’s MRV system.  
 
As well as these national governance institutions, Cameroon has also established Regional 
Coordination Units to help communities prepare for REDD+, as well as Conflict Resolution 
Committees to address and resolve disputes between stakeholders on REDD+ 
implementation and practice. Finally, the Consultation Circle of Partners of MINEPDED and 
MINFOF (CCPM) has been established to coordinate donor support for forestry and the 
environment through the activities of MINFOF and MINEPDED and essentially acts as 
mediator and facilitator between national actors on matters of forestry and REDD+. 
 
While REDD+ implementation has also led to the establishment of a National REDD+ 
Steering Committee (NRSC) in Ghana, the key actor is the REDD+ Secretariat, based in the 
Forestry Commission (FC). In the early days of REDD+ discussions, the FC successfully 
argued that REDD+ was essentially a forestry issue (rather than an environmental or 
financial issue, for example) and so should come within its remit. The fact that Ghana’s FC 
was already well-resourced and respected, and politically influential, obviously strengthened 
these arguments. The result, however, is that the FC has been the principal driver of REDD+ 
activities in Ghana. The final important institution to be established is the FC Climate Change 
Mainstreaming Committee to ensure that climate programmes such as REDD+ do not stand 
alone and that planning and forest operations effectively integrate climate change issues.   
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Table 3 Current and anticipated governance and economic impacts of REDD+ 
implementation 
Cameroon Ghana Sierra Leone 
Establishment of new institutions 
REDD+ Steering 
Committee 
National REDD+ Steering Committee (NRSC) National Protected Area Authority 
(NPAA) 
Technical Secretariat 
 
REDD+ Secretariat Company created for management of 
Gola forest carbon credit trade 
The National Observatory 
on  
Climate Change (ONACC) 
Forestry Commission Climate Change 
Mainstreaming Committee 
Regional REDD+ committees 
Regional coordination 
units 
  Multi-stakeholder committees 
Conflict resolution 
committees 
  Technical interventions on charcoal 
production 
CCPM (donor ‘circle’)     
Reform of existing institutions and activities 
REDD+ control moved 
from MINEP to 
MINEPDED 
National REDD+ Steering Committee (NRSC) 
expanded to include representatives of the EU 
FLEGT (Forest Law Enforcement, Governance 
and Trade) scheme Voluntary Partnership 
Agreement (VPA) 
Forestry Division reduced by removal of 
conservation unit, which was upgraded 
to a semi-autonomous authority (the 
NPAA) 
Domestic NGOs 
established and/or 
empowered  
MRV system made more elaborate Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
expanded to include the National 
Climate Change Secretariat 
Civil society organisations’ 
(CSOs) and communities’ 
participation  
in REDD+ pilots 
  Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development (MOFED)/National 
Revenue Authority (NRA) given 
responsibility for new revenue source 
Holding of 
regional/divisional 
consultations 
  CSOs participation in REDD+ pilots 
   More/better enforcement (i.e. MRV) 
New revenue streams established 
Capacity building finance 
Pilot projects finance 
Long-term carbon finance 
Existing revenue streams affected 
Concession fees rise/fall 
Export fees stable/fall 
Stumpage fees rise/fall 
Alternative land use revenues rise/fall 
 
The most important new institution established in Sierra Leone is the National Protected Area 
Authority (NPAA), which was formed out of the former Conservation Unit of the Forestry 
Division and is the lead agency for REDD+ implementation. The Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Food Security (MAFFS) oversees both of these agencies. Another important 
new institution is the not-for-profit company established to manage the trade in Gola Forest 
carbon offsets in the voluntary carbon market. As in Cameroon, Regional REDD+ 
Committees are on the verge of being established to serve as reference points for REDD+ in 
the regions. A multi-stakeholder committee is planned but not yet established largely due to 
the Ebola outbreak in the country. The rationale for the multi-stakeholder committee is to 
facilitate involvement of all parts of society in the propagation and adoption of the REDD+ 
mechanism. Sierra Leone is also in the process of implementing pilot projects on sustainable 
charcoal, a move started by the Ministry of Energy and being considered as an activity under 
the EU funded REDD+. The rationale for such a move is to change how charcoal is produced 
and used to reduce negative impacts on conservation and on the national forest reserves.  
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The establishment of these institutions has, in some cases, directly impacted upon existing 
institutions. In Cameroon, the Ministry of Environment and Nature Protection (MINEP) was 
expanded in 2012 to form the Ministry of Environment, Nature Protection and Sustainable 
Development (MINEPDED), which included sustainable development issues and was 
therefore a more natural home for REDD+. In Ghana, the Natural Resource and 
Environmental Committee (NREC), an inter-ministry body that might have been expected to 
obtain oversight of REDD+, was expanded to include representatives of the EU FLEGT 
programme.  
 
In Sierra Leone, the Forestry Division was reduced in size when its conservation unit was 
split off, turned into the NPAA, and given responsibility for REDD+. The Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) has also been expanded to incorporate the National Climate 
Change Secretariat (NCCS). The NCCS was established after Sierra Leone became a 
signatory to the Kyoto Protocol, and had been charged with developing climate change policy 
and establishing a regulatory framework to enable Sierra Leone to participate in the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) and REDD+. Despite this, the NCCS did not get oversight 
of REDD+ because the management of forests and conservation does not rest with them, but 
with the NPAA. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MOFED) and National 
Revenue Agency (NRA) have responsibility for revenues from REDD+. 
 
Other governance impacts are less concrete and continue to evolve. Implementation has 
seen more involvement of civil society organisations in REDD+ activities. A pilot payment for 
environmental services (PES) project has been implemented by CED, a national NGO, for 
example. Although no national or subnational fund and/or benefit-sharing mechanism for 
REDD+ has been established in Cameroon, WWF and other NGOs have been building 
wildlife monitoring capacity within local communities. The impact of these final institutional 
changes will be determined by answers to the questions considered above on REDD+ 
scenarios, and so will be considered in more detail below.  
 
Turning to new revenue streams, we can distinguish three different types. First, there is 
finance to support capacity building – i.e. ‘REDD+ readiness’. To a greater or lesser extent, 
all of our case studies have received finance of this kind. Second, there is finance to support 
the implementation of pilot projects. While both Ghana and Cameroon have obtained 
significant finance in this form, Sierra Leone has not yet reached this stage in REDD+ – 
notwithstanding the Gola Forest project which has been separately funded by the Royal 
Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB). The third form of new revenue stream is long-
term carbon finance to support REDD+ objectives, which is our primary area of interest in 
terms of new financial flows. While none of our countries have been recipients of this kind of 
finance, one goal of this study has been to explore its potential impacts. As described above, 
this will largely be determined by the scale, form and value of REDD+ financial flows in the 
future. The impact of these different scenarios in this regard will be explored below.  
 
The economic impacts on existing revenues will be similarly contingent on these scenarios. 
Table 3 (above) describes four main types of potential impact, where REDD+ finance could 
affect current revenue streams from: a) forest concessions; b) forestry exports; c) stumpage 
fees; and d) alternative land uses (such as agriculture). There are two forms of potential 
impact. First, REDD+ could lead to a higher or lower volume of revenues by increasing or 
decreasing the quantity of each activity. A second potential impact is through the rate of 
return on these activities. The higher the value of REDD+ finance in terms of yield per 
hectare, and the more REDD+ coverage extends into forest areas that are not currently 
protected, the more we would expect to see a lower quantity of non-REDD+ forest activities 
and so lower revenues. If areas previously used for commercial forestry become protected 
under REDD+ programmes, the volume of revenues from forestry will fall.  
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To consider the impacts that these kinds of governance and economic changes could have 
under different scenarios, we need to consider how they could affect the main stakeholders 
in the forestry sector in each of the case study countries.  
 
4.3 Behavioural impacts under different scenarios 
 
Stakeholders are organised into four groups: central government agencies; 
decentralised/local agencies; private sector actors; and NGOs, civil society organisations 
(CSOs) and donor organisations. The formal and informal roles and interests in forest 
taxation and REDD+ were identified as part of the research, and an assessment made of 
how these could be affected under different REDD+ scenarios. These findings are presented 
in summary form here.  
 
Impacts are either positive (√), negative (x), neutral (-), or uncertain (?). While scenarios are 
assessed individually, the final impact will depend upon their combination in many cases. For 
example, the impact of a scenario where countries receive significant REDD+ financing (‘high 
REDD+ finance – national’) will vary depending on the unit value of this finance (high/low 
REDD+ finance per unit).  
 
4.3.1 Cameroon 
 
Table 4 details the potential impact on stakeholders in Cameroon of REDD+ implementation 
under different global scenarios (i.e. those that will be settled by decisions at the local or the 
global level). The shaded/unshaded areas highlight the categories of stakeholder. 
Respectively: central government; local government; private sector; and 
donors/NGOs/CSOs. 
 
The first scenario concerns whether REDD+ finance comes with or without conditionality. 
Generally, central government agencies would prefer no conditionality, as this gives them 
more room for manoeuvre. The exception is the Ministry for Social Affairs (MINAS). As 
MINAS is concerned with enhancing the benefits received by local communities, 
conditionality may increase the probability of this happening.  
 
For decentralised/local entities, SGS9 is likely to benefit from conditionality that leads to 
improved governance, as this should reduce IFAs and non-compliance (for both tax and 
REDD+), making its monitoring and verification easier than would be the case otherwise. If 
conditionality extends to the activities of local councils, they are likely to view this in a 
similarly negative way to central government agencies. On the other hand, local communities 
may benefit from more effective governance if this leads to their receiving more benefits from 
tax/REDD+, but only if these benefits outweigh any lost through more restrictions on IFAs.   
 
For private sector stakeholders that have learned to operate in the existing governance 
environment, conditionality – that is effective – may be viewed negatively. Over the longer 
term, however, a more effective governance regime may be positive for private actors. So 
while existing stakeholders would be likely to oppose (hence the negative mark), 
perspectives over the longer-term could change on this issue. Donors, NGOs and CSOs 
would be more likely to view conditionality favourably.   
 
The second scenario concerns the total level of annual REDD+ financing received, while the 
third deals with the relative returns available from REDD+ compared with different land uses. 
‘High REDD+ finance per unit’ means that the potential returns from REDD+ in a given area 
are at least equal to those that could be obtained from forestry (and competitive with those 
                                                          
9  SGS is a global inspection, verification, testing and certification company. It plays a key role in monitoring Cameroon’s 
forestry sector. http://www.sgs.com/ 
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from other land uses such as agriculture). This therefore also captures price movements in 
timber and other commodities.  
 
Table 4 Stakeholder impacts in Cameroon under global scenarios 
 
Central government stakeholders are likely to prefer high REDD+ finance scenarios. There 
are two potential exceptions. First, ministries in competition with those responsible for 
REDD+ implementation. The main example here is the Ministry of Forests and Wildlife 
(MINFOF), which would further lose ground to the Ministry of Environment, Nature Protection 
and Sustainable Development (MINEPDED) under a high finance national scenario. The 
second exception is sectors that may be in competition with REDD+ over land use, 
particularly the Ministry of Agriculture, which could see potential agricultural land used for 
REDD+, negatively affecting its interests. The strength of this effect will be determined by the 
relative value of REDD+ finance. Where this is high, forestry and other land uses such as 
agriculture could be displaced by REDD+, negatively affecting the relevant ministries.  
Scenario 1 2 3 
 Governance 
conditions 
No 
conditions 
High 
REDD+ 
finance 
(national) 
Low 
REDD+ 
finance 
(national) 
High 
relative 
REDD+ 
finance 
(per unit) 
Low 
relative 
REDD+ 
finance 
(per unit) 
Prime Minister’s Office/Presidency  X √ √ X √ X 
MINFOF (Ministry of Forestry and 
Wildlife) 
X √ ? √ ? √ 
MINFI (Ministry of Finance), Direction 
Générale des Impots – tax agency 
(DGI), PSRF (Forest Revenue 
Security Programme), CIME (Taxation 
Centre for Medium-sized Enterprises) 
X √ √ X √ X 
MINEPDED  X √ √ X √ X 
MINAS  √ X √ X √ X 
MINADER (Ministry of Agriculture and 
Rural Development) 
X √ ? √ X √ 
MINATD (Ministry of Territorial 
Administration and Decentralisation) 
X √ √ X √ X 
MINEE (Ministry of Energy and Water 
Resources) 
X √ - - -  
IRAD (Institute of Agricultural 
Research for Development)   
X √ √ X √ X 
SGS √ √ √ X √ X 
Councils  X √ √ X √ X 
Communities/villages  √ X √ X √ X 
Private logging concessions  X √ X √ X √ 
Association of timber factory owners 
and workers 
X √ X √ X √ 
Timber associations X √ X √ X √ 
Transnational corporations (TNCs)  X √ X √ X √ 
Landowners X √ ? √ √ X 
Donors √ X √ X √ X 
International NGOs/media  √ X √ X √ X 
National NGOs, CSOs, media  √ X √ X √ X 
Media √ X √ X √ X 
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The situation for decentralised entities is clearer. While they would potentially benefit from all 
high REDD+ finance scenarios, the actual impact on councils and communities would also 
be affected by benefit sharing arrangements and coverage. Where relative REDD+ finance is 
high, this raises the possibility that REDD+ could displace other land uses, but only under 
scenarios where REDD+ is extended beyond current protected areas to those with 
commercial uses. Where this is the case, the impact on councils/communities would be 
determined by whether the benefit sharing arrangements are more generous under REDD+ 
than has been the case under the existing land use (e.g. forestry or agriculture). 
 
Private sector stakeholders in the forestry sector would be negatively affected by high 
REDD+ finance scenarios, as this increases the probability that the implementation of 
REDD+ could reduce the economic activity that they rely on (i.e. formal and informal 
logging), and therefore their revenues. The situation with landowners is somewhat different, 
as they have the option of switching to REDD+ financed conservation. They would only 
benefit from this, however, if the relative returns available from REDD+ were greater than 
those received from existing land uses.  
 
Generally, donors, NGOs, and CSOs are supportive of REDD+ objectives and so would 
prefer high finance REDD+ scenarios, as this increases the prospect of these objectives 
being realised. For donors, the caveat is that this will be influenced by how much they have 
to finance these programmes. For NGOs and CSOs, this would be contingent on equitable 
benefit sharing within REDD+ programmes. 
 
Table 5 applies the same approach to domestic scenarios. For reasons of brevity, only one 
scenario is given in each case – e.g. the alternative to ‘extensive coverage’ is ‘limited 
coverage’. Predicted impacts on stakeholders in these alternatives would obviously be the 
opposite of those given here.  
 
Table 5 Stakeholder impacts in Cameroon under domestic scenarios 
 
Scenarios 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Extensive 
coverage 
Effective 
MRV 
High 
participation 
Equitable 
sharing 
of 
benefits 
National 
implement-
ation 
Sector 
implement-
ation 
Use of 
existing 
channels of 
disbursal 
Prime Minister’s 
Office/Presidency  
? √ ? ? √ - √ 
MINFOF  √ √ √ X √ √ √ 
MINFI (DGI, 
PSRF, CIME) 
? √ √ X √ X √ 
MINEPDED  √ √ ? X √ √ X 
MINAS  √ √ √ √ √ - - 
MINADER  X √ - - √ X - 
MINATD  √ √ - - √ - - 
MINEE  - - - - - - - 
IRAD  √ √ √ √ - X - 
SGS √ √ √ √ - - - 
Councils  ? √ √ √ X ? - 
Communities ? ? √ √ X ? X 
Private logging 
concessions  
X ? 
 
- - - - - 
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Association of 
timber factory 
owners/workers 
X ? - - - - - 
Timber 
associations 
X ? - - - - - 
TNCs  X ? - - - - - 
Landowners ? ? - - - - - 
Donors √ √ √ √ ? ? ? 
International 
NGOs/media 
√ √ √ √ ? ? ? 
National NGOs, 
media 
√ √ √ √ ? ? ? 
Media √ √ √ √ ? ? ? 
  
The first scenario concerns whether REDD+ is limited to existing protected areas or 
extended to areas currently used for other, commercial activities. It is uncertain what position 
the Prime Minister (PM)/Presidency might take on this, as the net impact on government 
finances would be determined by whether this took place under a high- or low-finance 
REDD+ scenario. For high finance scenarios both would be likely to be in favour. Other 
government agencies would either see a positive or neutral impact, with the exception of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, which could see the land available for agriculture reduced.   
 
At the local level, SGS would benefit from a more extensive MRV system, while the impact 
on councils and communities would depend on whether coverage was extended in high or 
low finance, and equitable or inequitable scenarios. High coverage, high REDD+ finance and 
an equitable distribution of benefits would favour these stakeholders, while high coverage, 
low finance and/or inequitable benefit distribution would not.  
 
All private stakeholders would be negatively affected by extensive coverage, with the 
potential exception of landowners, depending on REDD+ finance outcomes. Given their 
support for REDD+, donors, NGOs and CSOs would be likely to be supportive of the 
extensive coverage scenario.  
 
Most stakeholders have an interest in seeing effective MRV systems in place. The exception 
would be private stakeholders involved in illegal logging. Similarly, most stakeholders would 
be positive or neutral about high participation of different stakeholder groups in REDD+ 
programmes. The position of MINEPDED (the lead REDD+ agency) and the PM/Presidency 
is more uncertain, however, as greater participation of different actors reduces their own 
ability to shape the way REDD+ evolves in Cameroon.  
 
Different actors are likely to approach benefit sharing in a similar way. Those that would 
benefit from a more equitable system (e.g. local councils and communities) would be in 
favour, while those who would potentially see their own revenues fall as a result would not 
(e.g. relevant central agencies). The position of the PM/Presidency is unclear, as an 
equitable system would be positive for the country’s reputation internationally, not least as it 
would be strongly favoured by donors and international NGOs.  
 
Whether REDD+ is implemented at the national or local level will create similar effects. 
Central agencies would no doubt prefer the former, and local entities the latter. Other 
stakeholders would either be neutral, or, in the case of donors, NGOs and CSOs and local 
communities, uncertain. Here, preferences would be shaped by these actors’ view on the 
relative competence and honesty of central versus local implementing agencies, and whether 
local communities would benefit more or less in each case.  
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The final two scenarios would generate similar incentives for incumbent or new actors. If 
REDD+ is implemented via sector actors (i.e. those involved in forestry) then these types of 
agency would be in favour, and alternative implementing agencies opposed. Similarly, if 
funds are disbursed through the same channels as existing forest finance, incumbents would 
be in favour and alternative agencies opposed. The assessment of donors, NGOs and 
communities is the same as in the previous scenario.  
 
4.3.2 Ghana 
 
Table 6 describes the potential impacts of global scenarios on stakeholders in Ghana. As in 
Cameroon, governance conditionality would be likely to be opposed by central government 
agencies. Whether the Forestry Commission would take a similar stance is unclear. For 
traditional authorities and forest communities, impacts would depend upon whether improved 
governance outcomes benefited them more than the costs of preventing other informal 
activities. For the private sector, we would expect neutral impacts, with the exception of 
chainsaw operators. NGOs and donors are supportive of improved forest governance, and 
therefore would support conditions that achieved this.  
 
Table 6 Stakeholder impacts in Ghana under global scenarios  
Scenario 1 2 3 
 Governance 
conditionality 
High REDD+ 
finance (national) 
High relative REDD+ 
finance (per unit) 
Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources (MLNR) X √ √ 
Ministry of Environment, Science, Technology and 
Innovation (MESTI) Climate Change Centre 
X -  
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
(MOFEP)  
X √ √ 
Forestry Commission (FC) ? √ √ 
Forest Service Division (FSD), FC ? √ √ 
Timber Industry Development Division (TIDD), FC ? X X 
Administrator of stool lands - - - 
Metropolitan, municipal and district assemblies - ? ? 
Forest forums ? - - 
Traditional authorities ? ? ? 
Forest communities  ? ? ? 
Ghana Timber Millers’ Organization (GTMO)  
 
- X X 
Domestic Lumber Trade Association of Ghana  
(DOLTA) 
- X X 
Wood Workers Association - X X 
Chainsaw operators X X X 
NGOs √ √ √ 
Donors √ √ √ 
 
For central government, high REDD+ finance at the national level would positively affect 
agencies that are involved with REDD+ implementation (MLNR and FC), and those 
responsible for government budgets (MOFEP), while negatively affecting agencies that have 
been kept out of the process (MESTI). Impacts on local agencies are contingent upon the 
approach to benefit sharing. 
 
Impacts in this regard will be partly shaped by the third scenario: the relative value of REDD+ 
finance compared with other land uses (including the export sector as discussed for 
Cameroon). If REDD+ finance per unit of carbon is high enough to compete with other land 
uses, then it will positively affect stakeholders whose interests are aligned with REDD+ 
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objectives (MLNR, FC, donors and NGOs), and negatively affect private sector stakeholders 
whose commercial interests could be threatened (i.e. the strength of these impacts would be 
determined by how extensive REDD+ coverage is in practice).  
 
Table 7 examines the impact of this coverage issue, as well as other domestic scenarios in 
Ghana. For extensive REDD+ coverage, the interests of the FC’s Timber Industry 
Development Division (TIDD) are aligned with these stakeholders, creating similar effects. 
While the Forestry Commission, donors and NGOs would be expected to favour this 
scenario, the impact on other stakeholders would depend on the factors considered above, 
particularly how REDD+ revenues compare with other sources of income (e.g. shares of 
forest taxes) and how equitably the new revenues are distributed.  
 
As in Cameroon, actors who benefit from illegal activities would oppose an effective MRV 
system. Chainsaw operators are the clearest example but are unlikely to be the only one.   
 
Table 7 Stakeholder impacts in Ghana under domestic scenarios  
Scenarios 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Extensive 
coverage 
Effective 
MRV 
High 
participation 
Equitable 
sharing 
of 
benefits 
National 
implementation 
Sector 
implementation 
Use of 
existing 
channels 
of 
disbursal 
MLNR ? √ ? ? √ √ √ 
MESTI ? ? ? - √ X - 
MOFEP  ? √ ? X √ X √ 
FC √ √ √ ? √ √ √ 
FC (FSD) √ √ √ ? √ √ √ 
FC (TIDD) X √ - ? √ √ √ 
Administrator 
of stool lands 
- - - - X - - 
Local 
assemblies 
? √ √ √ X - ? 
Forest 
forums 
? √ √ √ - - - 
Traditional 
authorities 
? ? √ √ ? ? ? 
Communities  ? ? √ √ ? ? ? 
GTMO X ? - - - - - 
DOLTA X ? - - - - - 
Wood 
Workers 
Association 
X ? - - - - - 
Chainsaw 
operators 
X X ? ? - - - 
NGOs √ √ √ √ ? ? ? 
Donors √ √ √ √ ? ? ? 
 
Local stakeholders would benefit from more participation and from the more equitable benefit 
sharing systems that would be likely to result. Actors in favour of these goals (donors and 
NGOs, and the FC generally) would also benefit, while central agencies could see their 
influence and control diluted. 
 
Central agencies would favour national implementation of REDD+, and local agencies the 
opposite. Other groups would either be unaffected (private sector) or the impact would 
depend on which form most favoured their interests. The impact of the last two scenarios 
would be similarly determined. The perspective of donors, NGOs and communities on 
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whether current or new forms of disbursal are preferable, for example, would be shaped by 
their views on the current system and the proposed replacement.  
 
4.3.3 Sierra Leone  
 
Table 8 examines potential stakeholder impacts from global scenarios in Sierra Leone. For 
central government agencies, the impact of governance conditionality (which we take to be 
effective) is mixed. As in other countries, we assume this is negative for the Head of State 
and central ministries, as conditionality reduces their freedom to operate, and – other things 
being equal – would be opposed. 
 
Table 8 Stakeholder impacts in Sierra Leone under global scenarios  
 Governance 
conditionality 
High REDD+ finance 
(national) 
High relative REDD+ 
finance (per unit) 
Office of the President X √ √ 
Parliament √ √ √ 
National Protected Area Authority (NPAA) √ √ √ 
Forestry Division (FD) X X X 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) √ √ √ 
MOFED (Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development)/NRA (National Revenue Authority) 
X √ √ 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food 
Security (MAFFS) 
X X X 
Ministry of Lands X X X 
Ministry of Tourism X √ √ 
Ministry of Trade X X X 
Ministry of Transport X X X 
Law enforcement officers ? ? ? 
Municipal and local government  ? ? ? 
Traditional leaders ? ? ? 
Community members ? ? ? 
Timber associations X ? X 
TNCs (Miro Forestry company) √ ? X 
Union of Timber Factory Owners  X ? X 
Chainsaw operators/association X ? X 
Landowners  ? ? ? 
Donors  √ √ √ 
International NGOs √ √ √ 
Local NGOs √ √ √ 
 
In contrast, we assume that the impact on environmental agencies (NPAA and EPA) would 
be positive, as these scenarios would increase their ability to achieve their environmental 
objectives. The impact on law enforcement agencies is uncertain. Better governance would 
enable them to operate more effectively, but would also reduce the scope of their benefiting 
from illegal payments. The net impact – in terms of incentives – would therefore depend on 
the weight of corrupt actors.  
 
The impact on local stakeholders is uncertain. As with law enforcement, the net effect will 
depend on the proportion of each stakeholder group benefiting from illegal activities in the 
forestry sector. If this is relatively low, then improved governance would create net benefits, 
and vice versa.  
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To the extent that private sector actors benefit from the status quo, we assume most would 
see negative impacts from better governance – at least in the short term. Exceptions are 
TNCs (i.e. the Miro Forestry Company), which would benefit from a more robust governance 
regime. The current forest governance regime does not favour them as they continue having 
to pay traditional leaders and landowners despite having paid the official land leases. This 
company’s view is that if reforms are introduced as a result of REDD+, this will lead to 
improved community forest governance, which will benefit them. In terms of REDD+ 
scenarios, the view of the company’s Managing Director is that REDD+ will focus on 
reserved forest areas and not on community forests, where they have an interest.  
 
For REDD+ finance, central agencies would benefit from high national level financing, with 
the exception of those that are potentially in competition for land use (e.g. Ministry of 
Agriculture; Forestry Division) or could see a reduction in commercial activity as a result of 
REDD+ (e.g. Transport and Trade). The impacts on local agencies depend on the extent to 
which they benefit from this financing, either through benefit-sharing mechanisms or through 
allocations between central and local government. They are thus dependent on other REDD+ 
scenarios, as discussed below.  
 
The impact on private operators would be similarly contingent, with the most important 
determinants being whether REDD+ coverage was extended into areas currently used 
commercially (i.e. community forests), and whether the value of REDD+ finance (per unit of 
carbon) was high enough to enable REDD+ to compete with other commercial activities. This 
is reflected in the final scenario, where the private sector impacts of high relative REDD+ 
finance are negative. While also uncertain, the situation with landowners is rather different, 
as they could benefit under extensive coverage/high relative REDD+ finance scenarios 
through higher returns on their land than under current alternatives. 
 
The final table in this section looks at stakeholder impacts in Sierra Leone in areas decided 
domestically. For REDD+ coverage we see the now familiar pattern, where agencies that are 
supportive of REDD+ objectives are likely to benefit (NPAA; EPA; donors and NGOs), whilst 
those whose commercial interests could be adversely affected (private operators), or whose 
political influence could suffer (competitor ministries) would see the opposite impacts.  
 
Impacts on other stakeholders are uncertain. The impact on Parliament, for example, would 
depend on the effect of extended coverage on the constituencies of members of parliament, 
which would be a function of the approach to benefit sharing, as well as whether high or low 
REDD+ finance results. The impact on the MOFED of extended coverage would also be 
determined by REDD+ finance scenarios. Where both are high, extensive coverage could 
lead to a net increase in revenues, benefiting the MOFED. Where low finance scenarios 
combine with extensive coverage, however, revenues would fall.  
 
The Ministry of Agriculture, Forests and Food Security (MAFFS) is an interesting example. 
MAFFS would benefit from high finance, extensive REDD+ coverage scenarios, as it 
oversees the implementing agencies. It could also suffer, however, if REDD+ expansion 
reduced the scope for other, commercial activities that it is responsible for. The net impact 
would depend on the balance of these economic costs and benefits, and the actors for and 
against each of these within the ministry.  
 
The impact on local actors would be determined by the finance scenarios discussed above – 
i.e. whether they benefit from these to a greater extent than is the case under current 
arrangements.  
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Table 9 Stakeholder impacts in Sierra Leone under domestic scenarios 
 Extensive 
coverage 
Effective 
MRV 
High 
participation 
Equitable 
sharing 
of 
benefits 
National 
implementation 
Sector 
implementation 
Use of 
existing 
channels 
of 
disbursal 
Office of the 
President 
√ √ √ √ √ X √ 
Parliament ? ? √ √ ? ? ? 
NPAA √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
FD √ √ - ? √ √ √ 
EPA √ √ √ ? √ - - 
MOFED/NRA ? √ - X √ X - 
MAFFS ? ? - - √ √ √ 
Ministry of 
Lands 
X X - - √ X √ 
Ministry of 
Tourism 
√ √ - - √ √ - 
Ministry of 
Trade 
X X - - √ X - 
Ministry of 
Transport 
X X - - √ X - 
Law 
enforcement 
officers 
? ? - √ √ - - 
Municipal and 
local 
government 
? ? - √ X X √ 
Traditional 
leaders 
? ? √ √ X √ ? 
Community 
members 
? ? √ √ ? √ ? 
Timber 
associations 
X X - ? - - - 
TNCs (Miro 
forestry 
company) 
X √ - ? - - - 
Union of timber 
factory owners  
X - - ? _ _ - 
Chainsaw 
operators/ 
association 
X X - ? - - - 
Landowners  ? √ - ? ? ? ? 
Donors √ √ √ √ ? ? ? 
International 
NGOs 
√ √ √ √ ? ? ? 
Local NGOs √ √ √ √ ? ? ? 
 
The distribution of impacts of a good MRV system are almost identical, and for similar 
reasons. One exception is that larger forestry companies (i.e. the Miro Company) would 
benefit from a more effective system of MRV, as they are more able to comply. 
 
Local stakeholders would benefit under a high participation scenario, as would the 
parliamentarians who represent them. Agencies charged with implementing REDD+ 
objectives would also favour this scenario as it might increase their ability to achieve these 
objectives. Donors and NGOs would be similarly affected. Most other agencies would not be 
greatly affected by this scenario. 
 
For benefit sharing, we again contrast those who stand to benefit (e.g. local stakeholders) 
with those who could lose (e.g. central stakeholders whose share of REDD+ revenues could 
fall if they are more widely disbursed). The impact on private actors is here seen as 
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uncertain, as it is possible – if unlikely – that these actors could be recipients of REDD+ 
finance.  
 
Finally, the impacts of implementation and disbursement scenarios differ between 
stakeholders that benefit from the status quo (i.e. those currently for disbursing forest 
finance), or those who would benefit from national versus local implementation (i.e. central 
versus local governance agencies).  
 
Having considered how REDD+ implementation could affect the interests of different 
stakeholders, the next section examines the mechanisms through which these could 
influence forest tax outcomes.  
 
4.4 From behaviours to forest tax outcomes 
 
Previously, six potential objectives of forest tax systems were identified: revenue raising; 
sustainable forest management (SFM); equitable sharing of forest taxes; promotion of 
domestic industries; support for sustainable livelihoods; and good governance. In this section 
we explore how stakeholders could potentially influence these outcomes, before considering 
the role that policy could play.  
 
4.4.1 Central government stakeholders 
 
Table 10 links central government stakeholders to each objective. As the channels of impact 
are similar, this is presented generically, rather than being specific to each country. Of 
course, the division of responsibilities will vary between the countries, as will the specific 
agencies involved in particular cases. However, there is enough commonality for a general 
picture to emerge. An important area of difference, however, is on the degree of influence of 
different actors. This is considered in the following section on policy, where we explore how 
policy could affect the six potential outcomes.  
 
Depending on the degree of central control, the PM/Presidency has ultimate responsibility for 
decisions in each category. These range from deciding whether to sign international 
agreements on environmental or governance issues, to taking strategic decisions on the 
scale and form of commercial forestry within the country, the role of domestic industry and 
strategic land use in long-term development, and how all of these issues relate to areas that 
are protected for environmental reasons. The PM/President sets the tone on governance, 
and monitors and enforces behaviour on these issues.   
 
Finance ministries are the next most important actors in most countries, though they are not 
responsible for collecting forest taxes in our case study countries. Finance ministries do set 
the tone for the general attitude towards tax collection though, which will filter down to 
collecting agencies. For other outcome areas, ministries of finance affect policy through their 
influence on the PM/President, but can also block policies by withholding budget approval. 
Where tax objectives could negatively affect government revenues – if large areas are 
classified as protected areas, leading to a reduction in revenues from commercial activities, 
for example, or forest taxes are widely and ‘equitably’ distributed – the finance ministry could 
potentially block such moves.  
 
The next category of stakeholders are relevant sector ministries (environment, land, natural 
resources, forestry etc.) or sub-ministerial, implementing agencies (e.g. the Forestry 
Commission in Ghana or the NPAA in Sierra Leone). Below the strategic level, these are the 
most influential actors with respect to forest tax outcomes. They are responsible for 
allocating concessions, setting rates and collecting taxes, and will either control or strongly 
influence land use decisions, including the categorisation of protected areas. In conjunction 
with enforcement agencies, these stakeholders are also responsible for monitoring and 
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compliance. These activities exert a strong influence over forest tax outcomes, and the 
degree to which they are performed effectively and fairly does much to shape governance. 
 
Table 10 Forest tax objectives/outcomes and central stakeholder behaviours  
Stakeholders Forest tax outcomes Relevant behaviours 
President/PM Revenue raising  Influence policy on forestry activity, including scope of protected areas 
and strategic land use decisions 
 SFM Decide whether to sign and implement international agendas 
 Equitable tax share  Influence/shape policy 
 Domestic industry  Influence/shape policy 
 Sustainable 
livelihoods  
Influence/shape policy 
 Good governance  Set example, establish initiatives, monitor and enforce 
Finance ministry Revenue raising  Design and initiate policy. May collect taxes 
 SFM Can block policies (budget approval) and influence President/PM 
 Equitable tax share  Can design, influence or block policy 
 Domestic industry 
promotion 
Can design, influence or block policy 
 Sustainable 
livelihoods 
Can design, influence or block policy 
 Good governance  Monitoring budgets and auditing of ministry/agency activities 
Environment, 
resources, land and 
forestry ministries 
Revenue raising  May collect taxes. Can set rates and establish scope of protected 
areas, and level and form of protected areas. May influence/control 
land use more generally 
 SFM Monitoring and enforcement. Design, initiate and implement policy and 
engage in international discussions/agreements 
 Equitable tax share Can influence policy design 
 Domestic industry  Can influence supply of timber 
 Sustainable 
livelihoods  
Design, initiate and implement policy 
 Good governance  Set example, establish initiatives and capacity building  
Sub-ministerial 
agencies  
Revenue raising  May collect taxes. Can set rates and establish protected areas 
 SFM Monitoring/enforcement. Design, initiate and implement policy 
 Equitable tax share  Can influence policy design 
 Domestic industry  Can restrict supply of timber 
 Sustainable 
livelihoods  
Design, initiate and implement policy 
 Good governance  Set example, establish initiatives and capacity building  
‘Competing ministries'  Revenue raising  Can work with TNCs to promote trade, commercial forestry generally, 
or ecotourism  
 SFM Can be involved in establishing international standards 
 Equitable tax share  Not involved 
 Domestic industry  Supporting and promoting export sectors 
 Sustainable 
livelihoods  
Not involved 
 Good governance  Not involved 
Law enforcement  Revenue raising  Enforce compliance and punish offenders 
 SFM Enforce compliance and punish offenders 
 Equitable tax share  Prosecute corruption (i.e. diversion of resources) 
 Domestic industry  Not involved 
 Sustainable 
livelihoods 
Not involved 
 Good governance  Investigate and prosecute corruption 
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‘Competing’ ministries and agencies are those whose interests are served by a high value-
adding domestic forestry sector rather than the implementation of REDD+ across the 
country. Consequently, they are likely to encourage those elements within implementing 
agencies that are supportive of these goals, and lobby at higher levels of government to this 
effect. The relative power of these stakeholders compared to REDD+ agencies is thus likely 
to be very important in determining which REDD+ scenarios emerge.  
 
The final sector of actors to consider are law enforcement agencies, the behaviour of which 
is crucial for outcomes in most of the areas considered, particularly those relating to 
compliance and governance.  
 
4.4.2 Local stakeholders 
 
Table 11 applies the same approach to local stakeholders. The first category is local, district 
or municipal councils. Generally, these have some responsibility for revenues and monitoring 
and compliance, and can therefore directly affect revenues raised. While they may have 
similar formal objectives to the central government stakeholders with respect to monitoring 
SFM, incentives are less strong as this does not generate revenues from which they benefit. 
The implementation of REDD+ has the potential to change this. 
 
These actors are not generally involved in determining how taxes are shared amongst 
stakeholders, or the development of domestic industry. In contrast, local councils may work 
with local NGOs to develop new forms of sustainable livelihoods, which may be a condition 
of NGO funding in this area.  
 
As with central government agencies, local councils have a key governance role to play in 
terms of the example they set. They can also affect governance through their influence over 
traditional leaders. 
 
Traditional authorities have a strong influence over revenue raising and SFM in their areas. 
As well as directly influencing whether certain fees are paid, they can either encourage IFAs 
by turning a blind eye to illegal logging (and profiting from this), or prevent illegal operators 
from using their lands. They are thus also key local actors with respect to good governance. 
They are also the main stakeholders promoting equitable benefit sharing for local 
communities and may work with NGOs to develop and promote sustainable livelihoods.  
 
Table 11 Forest tax objectives/outcomes and local stakeholder behaviours 
Stakeholders Forest tax outcomes Relevant behaviours 
Local councils Revenue  Collect some forest revenues; monitor/enforce compliance 
 SFM May manage local/community forest; prevent IFAs; promote reforestation; 
may use procurement to support legal timber 
 Equitable tax  Not involved 
 Domestic industry  Not involved 
 Sustainable livelihoods  Can work with NGOs to develop (may be funding condition) 
 Good governance  Can demand accountability from traditional leaders, and manage internal 
resources effectively (or not) 
Traditional 
authorities 
Revenue raising  Influence payment of forest fees; may allow/prevent illegal operators to 
work without paying fees/taxes 
 SFM Can allow chainsaw operators to function; can promote reforestation; and 
restrict access to culturally important forests 
 Equitable tax share  Advocates for increasing community shares and control  
 Domestic industry 
promotion 
Not involved 
 Sustainable livelihood 
promotion 
Work with/advise NGOs/CSOs to design livelihood interventions. 
Custodians of traditional, indigenous knowledge 
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 Good governance  Sets example (good or bad) 
Communities Revenue raising  Potential to reduce or block logging; can be involved in land-use 
conversion and felling trees for charcoal; may benefit from illegal logging, 
but best placed to reduce this. Alternatively, can protect illegal operators 
by providing cover 
 SFM Potential to promote/ensure SFM. Providers of labour for illegal activities 
 Equitable tax share  Promote equitable sharing of benefits 
 Domestic industry  Potential supply of labour and beneficiaries 
 Sustainable livelihoods  Potential beneficiaries  
 Good governance  Can promote or obstruct as described 
 
Local communities are also key actors with respect to revenue generation and SFM. They 
can participate in or tolerate illegal logging, reducing potential revenues, and creating 
negative environmental impacts. On the positive side, they are also well placed to prevent 
these activities, by undertaking monitoring activities to promote SFM and governance.  
 
4.4.3 Private sector stakeholders 
 
Table 12 looks at the behaviour of private sector stakeholders in relation to forest tax 
outcomes. TNCs have significant lobbying power, and so have the ability to influence policy, 
particularly for revenue raising (e.g. tax rates) and SFM (e.g. extent of protected areas and 
restrictions on commercial logging activities). Some TNCs focus purely on logging for export, 
while others are more involved in the domestic sector. Their behaviours in this respect are 
thus an important determinant of outcomes related to domestic industry. Through their 
employment practices and corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities, TNCs also have a 
strong influence on the creation and maintenance of ‘sustainable livelihoods’ (defined to 
include employment with TNCs). Finally, given their influence and economic weight in the 
sector, and their approach to tax compliance and bribery, TNCs are one of the most 
important drivers of good governance.  
 
Table 12 Forest tax objectives/outcomes and private sector stakeholder behaviours 
Stakeholders Forest tax outcomes Relevant behaviours 
TNCs Revenue raising  Can lobby for lower taxes and comply with taxes (or not) 
 SFM Can lobby for weaker policy, adhere to agreements (or not), promote 
certification (or not) 
 Equitable tax  Not involved 
 Domestic industry  Can focus on export sector or promote local industry 
 Sustainable 
livelihoods  
Can support sustainable livelihoods (broadly defined) through 
employment and CSR  
 Good governance  Can pay bribes or not; can demand accountability from state institutions 
for payments 
Domestic logging 
firms 
Revenue raising  Can comply or not 
 SFM Can adhere to agreements (or not), promote certification (or not) 
 Equitable tax  Not involved 
 Domestic industry  Directly involved as most processing and industry development are 
carried out by domestic firms 
 Sustainable 
livelihoods  
Provide employment and can provide CSR 
 Good governance  Can pay bribes or not; can demand accountability from state institutions 
for payments 
Concession holders  Revenue raising  Pay taxes or not. Largely stumpage fees 
 SFM As per concession agreements, may be obliged to replant, limit total 
felling and respect restrictions on particular species. Can comply or not 
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 Equitable tax share  Not directly involved, but can push for disbursal to local areas to obtain 
support from traditional leaders 
 Domestic industry  Some are millers and some just log. Latter have little direct impact, but 
they may choose to supply local small wood industries, depending on 
difference between local and international prices 
 Sustainable 
livelihoods  
Provide employment and can provide CSR 
 Good governance  May (or may not) pay bribes to acquire concessions. May also pay bribes 
to forestry officials, police and traditional leaders, and recruit illegal 
operators 
Unions/trade 
associations 
Revenue raising  Lobby to reduce tax burdens; can support member compliance  
 SFM Can support reforestation and sustainable commercial logging 
 Equitable tax  Not involved 
 Domestic industry  Supportive of domestic industries 
 Sustainable 
livelihoods  
Employment and CSR    
 Good governance  Monitor members (at least this is formally the case) 
Chainsaw operators Revenue raising  Potential loss of fees; potential loss of stumpage (where commercial 
logging permitted) 
 SFM Quantity of logging and selective logging of high value trees 
 Equitable tax  Not involved 
 Domestic industry  Compete (more cheaply) with legal traders to supply timber to local 
market; difficult for legal suppliers to compete 
 Sustainable 
livelihoods  
Source of income for local people 
 Good governance  Pay bribes to forestry officials, police, traditional leaders 
 
Domestic logging firms undertake similar activities but may have less lobbying power. As 
they supply most of the timber to the local market, they are also key to domestic industrial 
development, and can promote or prevent the use of legal timber.  
 
Concession holders are also involved in the same activities and thus have similar potential 
impacts on outcomes. They may pay their taxes, comply with environmental agreements, 
and provide employment and social benefits to local people as set out in concession 
agreements. Alternatively, they may seek to avoid or minimise such obligations, including 
using bribes to facilitate this, or to obtain concessions in the first place. For most forest tax 
outcomes, therefore, they are key stakeholders.   
 
Broadly, unions and trade associations represent the interests of their members, and so 
reflect their positions. They may also be charged with monitoring the behaviour of their 
members, though the extent to which this happens in practice is far from clear. Where they 
do work actively, however, is in opposing the activities of illegal chainsaw operators, who 
undermine their members’ interests.  
 
As discussed at various points, chainsaw operators are key stakeholders in terms of forest 
outcomes. Through illegal logging activities they reduce tax revenues and cause 
deforestation. This has a negative impact on the other outcomes considered, though the 
payments these operators make to local people and traditional authorities may actually 
represent a crucial source of income. Whether all these stakeholders can be incentivised to 
change their behaviour and so improve tax outcomes in these areas depends on the extent 
to which they can be compensated for the loss in income this would entail.  
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4.4.4. Donors, NGOs and CSOs 
 
The final table in this section explores how the activities of donors, NGOs/CSOs and 
researchers affect forest tax outcomes. In the forestry sector, the most influential is the donor 
community. While these actors are beginning to pay more attention to tax and development 
issues, to join a long-standing, if weak, support for domestic industry development, their main 
focus has been on environmental and social issues, as well as governance. Given their 
influence over government, and central role in implementing REDD+ (and deciding on which 
global scenarios emerge), these actors are uniquely well-placed to affect policy changes that 
integrate tax and REDD+ objectives.  
 
Table 13 Forest tax objectives/outcomes and donor and NGO stakeholder behaviours 
Stakeholders Forest tax outcomes Relevant behaviours 
Bilateral/multilateral 
donors  
Revenue raising  Pressure authorities to reform forest laws (e.g. move tax 
rates) and enforce compliance 
 SFM Promote SFM and biodiversity 
 Equitable tax share  Can promote an increased share for local communities, 
and pressure for compliance 
 Domestic industry  Some promotion of economic development  
 Sustainable livelihoods  Work with NGOs to promote  
 Good governance  Conditionality and incentives for good governance 
INGOs Revenue raising  Support modernised forest laws, but environmental NGOs 
and those supporting indigenous people can also be 
hostile to logging (and thus revenue generation)  
 SFM Promote SFM and biodiversity 
 Equitable tax share  Promote an increased share for local communities, and 
pressure for compliance.  
 Domestic industry  Can reduce timber available through SFM 
 Sustainable livelihoods  Strong promoters of non-timber forest product (NFTP) 
industries and sustainable livelihoods 
 Good governance  Advocacy for transparency, accountability  
Domestic NGOs/CSOs Revenue raising  Can pressure government to ensure compliance (Ghana) 
but may focus on SFM issues (Sierra Leone) 
 SFM Primary focus in some countries (Sierra Leone) 
 Equitable tax share  Can be important, depending on weight of SFM in their 
interests 
 Domestic industry  Can reduce timber available through SFM 
 Sustainable livelihoods  Promote alternatives to logging in forest areas 
 Good governance  Advocacy for transparency, accountability  
Academic/policy  All objectives Forestry academics are traditionally focused on natural 
science, but 'social forestry' becoming more important 
(particularly in Ghana) 
 
While perhaps less influential on developing country governments – though not always – 
INGOs have similar interests to donors, although with the somewhat different emphases 
described above. They are also particularly influential on the activities of bilateral and 
multilateral donors, however, and are thus also a potentially key driver of forest tax/REDD+ 
integration. This would require engagement with forest tax issues, however, including 
overcoming the hostility that exists in some quarters.  
 
Both INGOs and their domestic counterparts are strongly involved in the promotion of 
sustainable livelihoods, particularly the promotion of non-timber forest product (NTFP) 
alternatives to logging. These activities, and the promotion of SFM and the extension of 
protected areas have negative implications for logging tax revenues, but not necessarily for 
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total revenues, depending on the nature of NTFP, and potential new sources of revenue for 
protected areas from REDD+.  
 
The final set of stakeholders are the forestry research community. Forestry research has 
traditionally been seen as a branch of the natural sciences, and so has had little to say on 
these outcomes. The emergence of ‘social forestry’, particularly in Ghana, has the potential 
to change this.  
 
Having examined how the interests of stakeholders may be affected by different REDD+ 
scenarios, and having linked their behaviours to outcomes with respect to forest taxation, the 
final section of this study completes the loop by looking at policy options in each country. The 
key questions are: what ‘forms’ of REDD+ implementation would be most likely to lead to 
better forest tax outcomes; which stakeholders are best placed to deliver these policies; and 
how can they be incentivised to do so?  
 
4.5 REDD+ scenarios, forest tax outcomes and policy options in each country  
 
4.5.1 REDD+ scenarios and forest tax outcomes 
 
Table 14 relates REDD+ scenarios (vertical) to forest tax outcomes (horizontal). In the 
preceding sections, we have examined the different stakeholders with respect to REDD+ and 
forest taxation in each of our case study countries, including, most recently, how the activities 
and behaviours of these actors could affect forest tax outcomes. Table 14 summarises and 
codifies these analyses. A ‘score’ is given in the final column. Positive impacts score 1, 
negative impacts -1, neutral impacts 0, and uncertain impacts 0.5. No pretence to precision 
is made. Rather the aim is to give an indicative sense of which REDD+ features are quite 
likely to have positive effects (very high scores), which would probably be negative (very low 
scores) and which are currently unclear, but would depend on the detail of implementation.  
 
Broadly, our scenarios all fall into one of these categories. The high scoring set (5+) are: 
governance conditionality; effective MRV; equitable participation and benefit sharing. As 
governance is key to outcomes in the forestry sector, it seems likely that effective 
conditionality that leads to improved sector governance as a result of REDD+ would also 
improve outcomes in forest taxation.  
 
Table 14 Potential impact of REDD+ scenarios on forest tax outcomes 
Forest tax 
outcomes 
Revenue 
raising 
potential 
SFM Equitable 
sharing of 
forest taxes  
Promotion of 
domestic 
industries  
Promotion of 
sustainable 
livelihoods 
Good 
governance  
‘Score' 
REDD+ scenarios        
Governance 
conditionality 
√ √ √ - √ √ 5 
High REDD+ 
finance (national) 
? √ - ? ? √ 3.5 
High relative 
REDD+ finance 
(per unit) 
X √ ? ? √ √ 3.5 
Extensive 
coverage 
X √ ? X ? √ 1 
Effective MRV √ √ √ √ √ √ 6 
High participation √ √ √ - √ √ 5 
Equitable sharing 
of benefits 
√ √ √ - √ √ 5 
National 
implementation 
? ? ? ? ? ? 3 
Sector 
implementation 
? ? ? ? ? ? 3 
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Use of existing 
channels of 
disbursal 
X X X X X X -6 
 
Effective MRV is the most obviously positive feature of REDD+. A key obstacle to all forest 
tax objectives is the prevalence of illegal forest activities. As well as reducing illegal logging 
in environmentally protected areas, an effective MRV system for REDD+ could be adapted 
and extended to commercial forests.  
 
The argument in favour of high participation and equitable sharing of the benefits of REDD+ 
programmes is subtler. Many poor outcomes in the forest sector involve local communities, 
either directly, or indirectly by ‘turning a blind eye’. The best potential observers of what is 
going on in many forests, particularly in remote areas, are local communities. To fulfil this 
potential, however, they would need to be compensated for any losses of income associated 
with IFAs. The careful distribution of REDD+ payments to ensure correct incentives creates 
an opportunity to do this. The chances of benefit sharing systems being designed in this way 
would be increased if these groups were fully involved in REDD+.  
 
The scenario that comes out as clearly negative (-6) is the use of existing channels of forest 
finance disbursal for REDD+ finance. In each case study, these funds are often diverted at 
various points. Channelling REDD+ funds through the same channels would be unlikely to 
lead to positive impacts on forest tax outcomes, therefore. The alternative is to establish new 
channels, and potentially reform the way forest taxes are disbursed to align with this new 
system. 
 
The impacts of the remaining scenarios are less clear. For both national/local or sector/non-
sector implementation, the impact would largely depend on the relative competence and 
integrity of these entities, with those most supportive of good governance creating the most 
positive impacts on forest tax outcomes. For our indeterminate scenarios in general, 
however, by far the most important factors are the two REDD+ finance scenarios and the 
extent of REDD+ coverage.  
 
The key determinant is the net effect on private sector actors. The private sector (formal and 
informal) is the main driver of deforestation. The formal sector is also the main source of 
forest tax revenues, the principal potential driver of local industrial development, and is 
central to good governance in the forest sector. Improving forest tax outcomes is impossible 
without private sector engagement. It is clear, therefore, that the achievement of positive 
outcomes for both REDD+ and forest taxation requires behaviour change on the part of 
private sector stakeholders. The unavoidable conclusion is that they should be incentivised 
appropriately, with a share of REDD+ finance used to offset any commercial losses. 
Crucially, this would also have to include informal chainsaw operators.  
 
To maintain incentives vis-à-vis other land uses, the value of REDD+ would have to be linked 
to commodity prices. Whether this is a ‘price worth paying’, particularly when opportunity 
costs are high due to commercially attractive alternative land uses, is an important area for 
future research. 
 
To summarise, our preferred mix of REDD+ scenarios for forest tax outcomes would be: 
effective governance conditionality; high REDD+ finance (national); high REDD+ finance 
(relative); extensive coverage; effective MRV; high participation; equitable sharing of benefits 
(including to affected private stakeholders); and new channels of disbursal. 
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4.5.2 Current policy debates in Cameroon, Ghana and Sierra Leone 
 
Decisions on the first three desirable features of REDD+ implementation will be taken at the 
supranational level. For significant REDD+ finance to have positive effects, it must be 
preceded and accompanied by major governance reform in forestry sectors. If not, REDD+ 
will fail to achieve its objectives, and risks making current governance problems worse. 
Second, unless and until there is a functioning global carbon market, REDD+ finance will be 
overwhelmingly provided by donors. How much they choose to provide will therefore 
determine the total amount of funding that is available. How donors and implementing 
agencies (e.g. UN-REDD) then choose to allocate funding between countries will determine 
how much annual finance each country receives. How these agencies then structure REDD+ 
programmes will determine how much REDD+ finance is provided per unit of carbon.  
 
The lack of a global carbon market suggests that some version of the opportunity cost 
funding method will be used, rather than relying on carbon market prices. While preferable to 
current carbon prices, current approaches to opportunity cost systematically underestimate 
what is likely to be required, and do not take sufficient account of non-economic constraints 
in many potential REDD+ countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa (Gregerson et al. 
2010). Although these difficulties are significant they do not appear to be insurmountable, 
particularly if REDD+ opportunity costs are estimated carefully and realistically, and 
governance reforms designed to address the main non-economic issues.  
 
Domestically, decisions have to be taken on the remaining issues: high/low participation; 
equitable/inequitable sharing of benefits; extensive/limited coverage; effective/ineffective 
MRV; new/existing channels of disbursal. In the remainder of this section, we consider policy 
debates in each country in these areas, and identify the actors with the greatest influence in 
these debates.  
 
a) Cameroon 
 
High vs. low participation of stakeholders in REDD+ planning and design 
While there is an ongoing participatory and consultative platform nationally and throughout 
the regions, actual consultation and participation is very limited and restricted to a narrow 
official agenda. Engagement to date has largely entailed information sharing and capacity 
building for national stakeholders as well as collecting feedback with regards to local 
problems, needs and perspectives. 
 
Going forward, Cameroon needs to strengthen the coordination of the inter-ministerial 
agencies in charge of forests, the environment and REDD+ activities, in addition to the efforts 
of the Consultation Circle of Partners of MINEPDED and MINFOF, a mainly donor-led 
platform. Roles and responsibilities between MINEPDED and MINFOF and key ministries 
need to be clearly defined. A promising option would be to strengthen existing initiatives such 
as the REDD+ and Climate Change Platform, made up of almost 60 CSOs, organised into 19 
civil society networks (REFACOF, RFC, and ROS4C 2011), which was created in July 2011 
with the aim of coordinating and channelling members’ contributions to REDD+ policy mainly 
through the Technical Secretariat (TS) within MINEPDED.  
 
Intergovernmental organisations are the most prominent actors in the REDD+ arena, 
followed by international NGOs and state agencies, domestic NGOs, donor agencies, 
domestic businesses, and national research institutions. Multinational businesses are the 
least prominent. Local universities, community groups and local authorities have so far not 
been very engaged with REDD+. Other relevant state agencies, such as those in charge of 
agriculture, mining, land tenure and economic planning, have little engagement and influence 
over REDD+. 
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Equitable sharing of benefits between local stakeholders  
The allocation of forest tax revenues is currently 50 per cent for the Central Government, 20 
per cent for the Special Equipment and Intercommunal Intervention Fund (FEICOM), 20 per 
cent for municipal councils and 10 per cent for forest communities. The governance, 
transparency, effectiveness, fairness and social justice shortcomings of this allocation have 
been well documented. The question is how, if at all, any REDD+ benefit sharing scheme will 
relate to this, especially given other existing gaps such as the lack of comprehensive laws or 
policies clarifying the rights of indigenous peoples.10  
 
More broadly, an analysis of existing rights to natural and forest resources, and their 
potential impacts on a mechanism for equitable benefit sharing, will be conducted under the 
leadership of the MINEPDED agencies. Existing mechanisms with options for benefit 
sharing, such as the Annual Forest Fee, with the allocation between the Central Government 
and decentralised entities outlined above, are being considered for their appropriateness with 
relation to REDD+.  
 
The current dominance of national stakeholders, such as the Ministry of Finance and 
FEICOM, as well as mayors and local elites, may need to be reviewed to ensure fair benefit 
sharing under REDD+. 
 
Extensive vs. limited coverage  
The TS within MINEPDED has established criteria for REDD+ pilot initiatives in Cameroon 
over a clearly defined land area. While many REDD+ initiatives have been proposed, they 
are focused on capacity building, research and information exchange and do not fulfil the 
criteria laid down by the REDD+ Steering Committee and therefore do not yet qualify as 
‘pilots’. The TS aims to enhance understanding of the direct and indirect causes of 
deforestation and forest degradation in these areas, leading to suggestions for ways to slow 
down or reverse this tendency. But these ideas and initiatives are still mainly donor initiated 
and led, with the national agencies still in their infancy, or lacking the technical and financial 
resources and/or political will to initiate such initiatives and reforms. 
 
Given the politically contested nature of forest tax governance, benefits sharing and reform in 
Cameroon, it seems likely that questions of the likely coverage of REDD+ will be 
controversial. As the REDD+ agenda has been driven primarily by the donor community to 
date, and as this is likely to continue for the foreseeable future, their influence on this 
question is likely to be significant. This is likely to occur in a variety of ways, such as 
influencing government policy and strategy development, initiating and supporting pilot 
projects, and providing financial and other support to empower and build the capacities of 
fledgling national stakeholders such as central government agencies, civil society 
organisations and community groups. The persistent governance and distributional issues 
documented in the forest tax system elsewhere are likely to be repeated under REDD+, 
unless the unlikely but much needed drastic reforms and implementation are initiated. 
 
Effective MRV 
There is as yet no domestic MRV system in place. The MRV unit within the TS is responsible 
for constructing the national (carbon stocks) reference scenario and the MRV system. The 
National Observatory on Climate Change (ONACC), on the other hand, will participate in 
monitoring carbon stocks and play a role in the management and approval of REDD+ 
projects and programmes, with SGS likely to be the independent observer and monitoring 
agency.  
                                                          
10  While no benefit-sharing mechanism for REDD+ currently exists, the Centre pour l’Environnement et le Développement 
(CED) has piloted a payment for environmental services (PES) programme, and lessons are being learned. The PES 
initiative is the outcome of a partnership between the CED, BioClimate Research and Development (BioClimate) and 
the Rainforest Foundation UK, and is part of the first round of initiatives to be financed out of the US$100 million Congo 
Basin Forest Fund (CBFF), a multi-donor fund set up in 2008 to protect forests in the Congo Basin. 
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As in other areas, Cameroon has gained useful experiences from current or past REDD+ 
related pilots. These initiatives are implementing pilot projects with regard to forest 
monitoring/carbon mapping, including the provision and free access of new and archival 
satellite images. The regional FAO-COMIFAC-CBFF MRV project (COMIFAC – Commission 
of Central African Forests), for example, supports Congo Basin countries in developing 
national forest-monitoring systems and standardised approaches to carbon stock estimation, 
in line with Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) guidelines. It is still 
necessary to review the existing data and methods, identifying gaps, and building capacities 
to develop protocols and systems adapted to the context of Cameroon. And the roles of the 
TS and ONACC require further clarification as they potentially overlap. 
 
Additional capacity building is still needed to strengthen MRV capacity to develop sound 
reference scenarios to monitor and track carbon emissions from deforestation. Current 
experience still points to continued dependence on foreign support and expertise for the 
foreseeable future.  
 
New channels of finance disbursal 
Legal forest revenues are distributed through the Ministry of Finance, FEICOM, municipal 
councils and the communities. The question is whether REDD+ finance will be disbursed 
through these channels, or through others, established specifically for this purpose.  
 
To date, the majority of REDD+ financing has come through bilateral and multilateral 
channels to support specific projects. While Cameroon supports carbon markets as a source 
of REDD+ finance, this does not look likely for the foreseeable future. Given the likely 
continued dependence on sub-national donor funded pilot projects, it is likely that most 
REDD+ funding will go directly to projects rather than being transferred to government. If so, 
this could suggest a higher prospect of benefits reaching local communities than under the 
current forest tax benefit sharing systems.  
 
Project level financing would not automatically enhance equitable benefit sharing at the local 
levels, however, as those could still be hijacked by local elites or lower levels of state 
bureaucracy; nor ensure effective implementation of the projects, given other weak 
governance issues and limited local absorptive capacity. Finally, a focus on project finance 
may generate hostility and low support from powerful central government agencies such as 
ONACC and the TS (under MINEPDED and the Ministry of Finance), which will wish to 
control foreign funding coming into the country. 
 
b) Ghana 
 
High participation of stakeholders 
Stakeholder participation is already significant in the planning and design of REDD+ in 
Ghana. A key process was the development of the REDD+ safeguard instruments including: 
a Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment (SESA); Environmental and Social 
Management Framework (ESMF);11 and a Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF).12 
                                                          
11  The purpose of the ESMF is to: establish clear procedures and methodologies for the environmental and social 
assessment, review, approval and implementation of interventions to be financed under the project; specify appropriate 
roles and responsibilities, and outline the necessary reporting procedures, for managing and monitoring environmental 
and social concerns related to project interventions; and determine the training, capacity building and technical 
assistance needed to successfully implement the provisions of the ESMF. The ESMF for REDD+ has been prepared to 
be consistent with the already drafted ESMF for the other World Bank financed forest management initiative, the 
Forestry Improvement Programme (FIP) and other related programmes such as the World Bank’s Dedicated Grant 
Mechanism (DGM) and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This will ultimately 
feed into a sector Safeguards Information System.  
12  The preparation of a Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) is a requirement for projects that may entail involuntary 
resettlement, acquisition of land, impact on livelihoods, or restricted access to natural resources under the World Bank 
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Consultative workshops were undertaken to inform the finalisation of these frameworks and 
the workshops were well attended by CSOs in Ghana.  
 
The consultative processes for the development of the REDD+ dispute resolution and benefit 
sharing mechanism involved the active participation of civil society groups.13 Civil society 
groups are also well represented on the National REDD+ Working Group and the various sub 
working groups. In addition, several CSOs are engaged in initiatives which are 
complementary to REDD+. For example, the Conservation Alliance and the Nature 
Conservation Research Centre (NCRC-Ghana) are involved in analytical work and 
stakeholder consultations/training on climate-smart cocoa production systems, and the 
International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) has been implementing a forest 
landscape restoration project, focused on the issue of benefit sharing.  
 
The main issue in the REDD+ participation debate has been how to ensure that those who 
represent local communities and civil society are responsive and accountable. In practice, 
the Forestry Commission remains the most influential actor in this regard.  
 
Equitable sharing of benefits 
This is perhaps the most debated aspect of REDD+ in Ghana, not least as it is linked to 
issues such as land tenure and incentives with respect to illegal chainsaw milling. The IUCN, 
under its pro-poor REDD+ project, has stimulated a lot of discussion on benefit sharing. The 
Forestry Research Institute of Ghana was also commissioned recently to prepare options for 
benefit sharing under REDD+. A number of individual studies have also addressed aspects 
of benefit sharing which are very relevant to REDD+.  
 
The Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources has engaged a consultant to collate all the 
relevant lessons on the subject and present a synthesis for a national stakeholder 
consultation to build a national consensus. This was a critical component of the Ghana 
REDD+ Readiness Package submitted to the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership 
Facility (FCPF) in March 2016 as part of the overall strategy. The Forestry Commission, 
traditional authorities and civil society actors remain important actors in determining the 
content of the final benefit sharing arrangement. Notably, the Ghana legal working group 
facilitated by ClientEarth (an informal coalition of civil society actors interested in improving 
the legal framework for good forest governance), the IUCN, Forest Watch Ghana, the 
National House of Chiefs and the REDD+ secretariat of the FC are expected to be key 
influential actors.  
 
In Ghana, all naturally occurring trees are vested in the state. However, with respect to 
farms, no timber rights can be granted without the authorisation of the individual, group or 
owners concerned. For lands with private forest plantations or with any timber grown or 
owned by any individual or group, no timber rights can be granted. These arrangements 
have implications for any benefit sharing under REDD+. First, they define the boundaries of 
which eligible actors should benefit from any REDD+ project, depending on the land tenure 
system that prevails. Second, the constitutional formula on benefit sharing from natural 
forests that allocates specific proportions to managers, landowners and local government 
brings clarity and confusion at the same time. For instance, while it is clear who would be 
allocated benefits, the retention of 50 per cent of revenue by the FC as ‘management cost’ 
has been questioned, as farmers are also viewed as ‘managers’ in off-reserve areas. The 
third and perhaps most complicated issue, is how carbon rights will be defined in reference to 
tree or land ownership rights. These issues remain unanswered.  
 
                                                          
safeguard policy on involuntary resettlement. The RPF will provide project stakeholders with information on how to 
address compensation issues as related to affected properties/livelihoods, including land and income generation 
activities during project implementation. 
13  IUCN, Tropenbos International, Civic Response, Rainforest Alliance, Abantu for Development, National Forest Forum. 
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Extensive coverage 
While Ghana’s protected forests are primary targets for REDD+ projects, programmes will 
extend beyond these areas as the hot spots of deforestation also cover off-reserve areas. 
For example, the current Emissions Reduction Programme covers the forest-cocoa mosaic 
landscape. There are no policy restrictions yet on the extent of coverage. The Forestry 
Commission has a mandate to manage and develop forest resources. As the facilitator of 
REDD+ programmes, it remains an important actor, and will be the key stakeholder in 
determining the extent of REDD+ coverage.  
 
MRV 
The reference levels for forest emissions, and the GHG measurement approach, has been 
developed by Indufor OY,14 contracted by the Forestry Commission. The design of the MRV 
system is broadly in line with IPCC good practice guidelines. An internal report, produced for 
the Forestry Commission, dwells on forests, with guidance relating to other land use systems 
(which may be relevant for REDD+) remaining unaddressed. Moving forward, it will be 
important to move beyond current mechanisms for monitoring deforestation to a more robust 
system that can assist in measuring degradation and forest carbon stocks enhancement.  
 
In addition, an agreement for selective logging in the Emissions Reduction Programme 
accounting area (Ghana’s high forest zone) has been developed. Further work will be 
undertaken by the Forestry Commission during the additional funding phase of this 
programme to fill identified gaps in relation to Carbon Stock Enhancement and other 
elements of degradation (fire, illegal logging etc.). This work will be based on the standard 
operating procedures developed during the first phase of REDD+.  
 
New channels of finance disbursal 
The channels of distribution of REDD+ finance have not been decided, and to a large extent  
have been discussed in tandem with benefit sharing. If the channels of distribution stay within 
the boundaries of the current legal regime, the Forestry Commission and leading civil society 
groups will be key actors. Otherwise, the Ministries of Lands and Natural Resources and 
Justice and Attorney General, and the Parliament of Ghana, will be important in facilitating 
any constitutional reforms.  
 
c) Sierra Leone 
 
High participation of stakeholders  
Although there has been some stakeholder involvement in the RSPB-funded pilot carbon 
credit project in the Gola Forest, broad-based participation has been limited. Local 
communities are yet to be reached. Even where consultation has occurred, the results are 
rarely taken into consideration in policy formulation.  
 
The need to build the capacity of potential participants is an important prerequisite for 
participation. In this regard, NGOs, civil society groups and policy makers can play crucial 
roles. These stakeholders are also the agencies who by nature of their work and influence 
can actually promote high participation of community stakeholders in the REDD+ process. To 
ensure informed inputs from community stakeholders are captured in REDD+ planning and 
programme design, validation workshops with contributing community stakeholders should 
be held prior to concluding any programme design.  
 
Equitable sharing of benefits  
Communities will benefit from carbon credit sales from the Gola Forest project. Whilst forest 
field officers, researchers and NGOs are of the opinion that the community should have the 
                                                          
14  A consulting firm based in Finland which was contracted to lead the Ghana MRV development project. 
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largest share of revenues, the benefit sharing formula allocates just 15 per cent to 
communities, much lower than the 40 per cent suggested at earlier negotiations.  
 
As the formal owner of protected areas such as Gola, the government is able to dictate 
revenue shares. Community forests, in contrast, are owned by local communities, traditional 
authorities and, in some cases, private investors. The ‘community’ in this context refers to 
local landowners and traditional authorities (paramount chiefs) who are the custodians of the 
chiefdom lands. This suggests that the formula agreed for the Gola Forest may not be 
applicable in community forests, as communities will have more scope to argue for a larger 
share. If government were to propose a low community share, the country’s civil society 
groups would also advocate on behalf of the community.  
 
Perhaps more significantly, current forestry law makes provision for a higher community 
share of community forests, which should be applicable if REDD+ coverage is extended to 
these forests.  
 
Extensive vs. limited coverage 
A full inventory of Sierra Leone’s forests remains to be conducted, but there are already 
protected areas which REDD+ is expected to cover. To further preserve valuable flora and 
fauna, it has been suggested (based on interviews with conservation NGOs and forest 
communities in the Western Area forests) that REDD+ should include some community 
forests. Discussions with NPAA and Forestry Division officials suggest they support this 
move, both as a means of reducing deforestation and of potentially raising additional 
revenues from REDD+ finance. The position of the commercial unit of the Forestry Division, 
which could see revenues from forestry taxation fall, is less clear.  
 
The extent of community forest coverage will be the key issue, and the most important 
stakeholders in determining policy in this area are the Ministry of Agriculture, Forests and 
Food Security (MAFFS), the National Protected Area Authority (NPAA), the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) and, particularly, the Office of the President. To ensure their 
support, sufficient compensation to landowners, traditional authorities and local government 
for use of their community forests will be needed.  
 
How local communities are affected will also be key in determining their positions. 
Discussions with senior government officials suggest they understand this, and have 
proposed that communities are compensated if they support changing the classification of 
forests to national reserves under REDD+ programmes. The nature and scale of this 
compensation, relative to what is currently received from both formal and informal community 
forest sources, will be crucial in determining outcomes. 
 
Effective MRV 
At present, MRV activity in Sierra Leone is dominated by external actors, making the process 
slow and expensive, as well as raising issues of legitimacy. To ensure the MRV system is 
effective, efficient and legitimate, it should be owned and implemented domestically, whilst 
remaining compatible with the internationally agreed standards. If external MRVs are 
preceded by internal MRVs, the former will be less demanding and forecasting of REDD+ 
revenues quicker. Establishing internal MRV should make reporting easier, in the same way 
that internal audits help prepare institutions for external audits. While such a mechanism has 
yet to be set up, discussions with a senior official from the pilot carbon credit project have 
suggested this is imminent, and that a research department under the pilot project is being 
enhanced to conduct MRV internally. An interview with a key domestic CSO suggested the 
need for a strong monitoring and evaluation mechanism for REDD+ to ensure it is well 
implemented. 
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Any policy on national MRV should therefore include the setting up of an institutional MRV 
infrastructure, a clear mandate and the establishment of national capacity to meet REDD+ 
requirements.  
 
New channels of finance disbursal 
Forest tax revenues collected by the National Revenue Authority (NRA) are ultimately held 
by the central bank. Other fees collected by the Forestry Division are retained in their 
accounts. The government also supports forest activities by transferring revenues to MAFFS. 
Part of the government consolidated revenue fund provided to the NPAA (which leads the 
REDD+ implementation) is disbursed directly into their departmental accounts. Whilst the 
current disbursal mechanism for government stakeholders may be retained, that for 
traditional authorities, landowners and communities needs to be reformed to ensure 
effectiveness and transparency, but also to ensure the monies reach the intended community 
beneficiaries.  
 
Existing channels for disbursal consist of direct payments of cash to traditional authorities 
and local landowners. The establishment of accounts for beneficiaries and direct 
disbursement into such accounts was suggested by some community leaders in the Western 
Area as a way forward. Some community heads, private companies and forest CSOs also 
suggest that REDD+ resources should be deposited into community bank accounts for 
sustainable community development purposes.  
 
The Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, private timber companies and MAFFS 
are critical stakeholders in reforming the disbursal channels. MAFFs is the supervisory 
ministry for NPAA (which leads the REDD+ implementation) and also has the policy lead role 
in agriculture and forestry-related matters. MAFFS can recommend to the Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Development (MOFED) and the central bank that departmental accounts 
should be established at the government banks and then bank accounts set up at 
community/rural banks to cater for people in forest communities.  
 
5  Concluding remarks  
 
The research summarised in this paper has explored the impacts that REDD+ 
implementation could have on existing forest tax systems in three countries, and how policy 
could positively influence this. An important finding is that many of the most important 
decisions that will determine the impact of REDD+ remain open, so that a real window of 
opportunity exists for influence.  
 
If this opportunity is not taken, the risk is that REDD+ ends up being shaped by what is easy 
and feasible, rather than what is necessary and desirable. The overall level of REDD+ 
finance, and how it is valued in terms of carbon stocks, is a very good example. Rather than 
being driven by a careful assessment of what finance is needed – taking full account of the 
cost of vital governance reforms and the need to settle core issues such as land rights and 
livelihoods – the risk is that both the level and value of REDD+ will be driven by what can be 
pieced together from a range of donor sources. As has been analysed here, it is highly 
unlikely that such a REDD+ framework will achieve its goals, and it may even make existing 
problems in forestry sectors, including with respect to taxation, worse not better.  
 
This need not happen. If designed and implemented with care and sufficient resources, 
REDD+ has the potential to be a catalyst for positive change in forest governance and forest 
taxation. There is no shortage of research detailing what is required for this to be the case, 
and it is hoped this research will also make a positive contribution in this regard. What is 
needed now, at both the international and national levels, is the political will to deliver, and 
the financial resources to back this up.   
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